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Tiivistelmä 
Tässä tutkielmassa tarkastellaan GILTI- ja FDII-säännöksiä, jotka säädettiin osana kokonaisval-
taista Yhdysvaltojen verouudistusta nimeltään Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) loppuvuodesta 2017. 
Tutkielmassa keskitytään siihen, miten aineettomista saatua tuloa verotetaan näiden säännösten 
mukaan sekä siihen, miten säännökset vaikuttavat yhdysvaltalaisiin monikansallisiin konserneihin 
ja niiden rajat ylittävään verosuunnitteluun. Lisäksi säännöksiä tarkastellaan eurooppalaisesta nä-
kökulmasta ja ottaen huomioon kansainvälinen vero- ja kauppapolitiikka. Lopuksi huomiota kiin-
nitetään siihen, miten säännökset saattavat vaikuttaa kansainvälisen verotuksen kehittymiseen. 
FDII-säännöksen mukaan aineettomista saatua ulkomaista tuloa verotetaan 13,125% efektiivisellä 
verokannalla sääntömääräisen 21% yhtiöverokannan sijaan. Toisaalta GILTI-säännöksen mukaan 
väliyhteisöjen tuloa, joka ylittää aineellisen omaisuuden oletetun vuotuisen 10% tuoton, verotetaan 
10,5% efektiivisellä verokannalla yhdysvaltalaisen osakkeenomistajan tasolla, ellei samaa tuloa ole 
jo tosiasiassa verotettu riittävästi vieraassa valtiossa. 
Siten säännökset pyrkivät kannustamaan aineettomien pitämiseen Yhdysvalloissa ja kannustavat 
yhdysvaltalaisia monikansallisia konserneja viemään aineettomiin liittyviä tavaroita ja palveluja ul-
komaille. Toisaalta säännökset pyrkivät ehkäisemään aineettomien siirtämistä ulkomaille. Tutkiel-
massa kuitenkin huomataan, että koska FDII ja GILTI lasketaan oletusten perusteella, säännökset 
vaikuttavat myös aineellisen omaisuuden sijaintia koskeviin päätöksiin. Lisäksi säännösten vaiku-
tus rajat ylittävään verosuunnitteluun riippuu useista muista tekijöistä kuten säännösten pysyvyy-
teen liittyvästä epävarmuudesta sekä muiden maiden myöntämistä verohoukuttimista.  
FDII-säännöksen osalta on ollut epäilyksiä siitä, rikkooko säännös kansainvälisiä sitoumuksia ja 
muodostaako se haitallisen verotoimenpiteen tai kielletyn vientituen. Toistaiseksi FDII-säännöstä 
ei ole haastettu WTO:ssa, mutta se on vertaisarvioitavana OECD:n haitallisten verotoimenpiteiden 
foorumissa. Innovatiivisuudestaan johtuen FDII-säännös poikkeaa merkittävästi muista vastaavista 
toimenpiteistä. Siten on mahdotonta sanoa varmuudella, onko säännös lopulta kansainvälisiä vel-
voitteita rikkova.  
Lopuksi GILTI-säännöstä tarkastellaan kansainvälisen verotuksen kehitykseen liittyen. On ensin-
näkin katsottu, että GILTI-säännös on jo osaltaan ratkaissut digitaalisen talouden verotukseen liit-
tyviä haasteita. Lisäksi GILTI-säännös on toiminut inspiraationa OECD:n hiljattain ehdottamalle 
tulon sisällyttämistä koskevalle säännölle, joka toimisi eräänlaisena kansainvälisenä vähimmäisve-
rona. 
GILTI- ja FDII-säännökset ovat herättäneet paljon keskustelua kansainvälisen verotuksen kehit-
tämisestä ja verokilpailusta, ja on varmaa, että keskustelu jatkuu tulevaisuudessa. Jää nähtäväksi, 
miten GILTI- ja FDII-säännökset lopulta vaikuttavat näiden keskustelujen lopputulokseen.  
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1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Intangibles and Taxation  
The significance of intangibles has rapidly increased in modern business and trade.1 Value 
creation is no longer necessarily connected to tangible property such as traditional factories, 
plants, and physical manufacturing. Moreover, even if central operations of many 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) are still connected to tangible assets, it does not exclude 
the use and importance of intangibles. Affected by prevailing competitive situation in the 
markets, MNEs aim to constantly enhance their activities and identify new opportunities. 
Hence, technological innovations are often exploited to facilitate and speed up traditional 
manufacturing.  
The increased importance of intangibles has been noted in a study which compared the book 
value and stock market value of the top 150 U.S. companies. In 1984, the book value 
corresponded to approximately 75% of the company’s stock market value. However, by year 
2005 it had dropped to 36%. The remaining value, in 2005 almost two thirds, lies in the 
companies’ intangible assets.2 Taking into consideration how rapid technological 
development has been, it can be assumed that nowadays intangibles represent even larger 
share of the companies’ stock market value. It is said that U.S. companies derive 80% of 
market value from intangible assets and own the majority of the world’s intellectual 
property.3 
The role and significance of intangibles also depend on how the they are defined. When 
discussing intangible assets, the focus has traditionally been on intellectual property, which 
can be subject to legal rights by establishing for example copyrights, trademarks, and 
patents. However, the definition of intangibles is much broader and extends to intellectual 
                                                 
1 See for example Dischinger – Riedel 2011 p. 691. 
2 Shapiro – Pham 2007 p. 5. 
3 Beller 2018 p. 37. 
2 
capital. Thus, the intangibles as we perceive them nowadays include also for example 
workforce, know-how, and customer lists.4 
As the intangibles increasingly contribute to MNEs’ value creation, they have also become 
subject to greater interest in taxation and accounting. On the other hand, the transfer of 
intangible assets has been quite effortless due to their non-physical nature and vague 
perceivedness, and MNEs have often ended up offshoring intangibles to remote tax havens.5 
Consequently, there has been even aggressive tax competition between countries that have 
aimed to become an attracting location for MNEs and their intangibles. Various countries 
have implemented patent box regimes and other national tax incentives, the purpose of which 
is to attract intellectual property to their territory in the hope that educated people, know-
how, and corporate and personal income streams will follow. Tax competition has taken 
place for example between the United States of America (U.S.) and the European Union 
(EU), but also between different EU Member States.  
Furthermore, the constant development of intangibles and their usage possibilities rapidly 
outdates tax law. Recent developments both in stipulated tax law and case law often relate 
to intangibles. This is also the case with the topic of this study, the so called GILTI and FDII 
provisions. These provisions stipulate the taxation of income deemed to be generated from 
intangibles. The provisions were recently enacted in the U.S. as part of an extensive federal 
tax reform under the name of the TCJA. 
1.1.2 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) was signed into law by President Trump on December 
22, 2017 and became Public Law No. 115-97.6 The TCJA amended the Internal Revenue 
Code (IRC)7 of 1986 to a large extent. The main objectives of this extensive tax reform were 
to grow the American economy and to simplify the complex federal tax system.8 However, 
                                                 
4 Wiederhold 2014 p. 36. The definition of intangibles will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
5 For example, based on a study that covered more than 14,000 MNEs in twelve OECD countries, technology 
intensive manufacturing MNEs that have significant level of intangibles are more likely to own subsidiaries in 
tax havens. See Jones – Temouri 2016 p. 238.  
6 The Act was actually signed into law with a title “An Act to provide for reconciliation pursuant to titles II 
and V of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2018”, but it is often referred to as the TCJA 
according to the title that was used when the Act was drafted. The abbreviation TCJA is used also in this study 
for reasons of clarity. 
7 The IRC includes nearly all federal tax laws and is published as Title 26 of the U.S. Code. Unless otherwise 
specified, all the following references to stipulated law are made to Sections of Title 26. 
8 The Goals of Donald J. Trump’s Tax Plan p. 1. 
3 
the final impact on economy remains to be seen. It is also unclear whether the tax system 
was after all simplified.9 Although the TCJA clarified the system to a certain extent, it also 
introduced many new provisions and exceptions, some of them being in force temporarily 
until 2026.10 
The TCJA broadly covers various aspects of federal and cross-border taxation. As the U.S. 
has a central position in world trade and business, the TCJA is expected to have a profound 
impact on international business markets. Perhaps the most essential amendments introduced 
by the TCJA in this regard are the reduced U.S. federal corporate income tax (CIT) rate from 
35% to 21% and the transition from worldwide tax system to principle of territoriality. Under 
the worldwide taxation, all income received by U.S. persons was taxable in the U.S. 
Accordingly, income earned by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. MNEs was subject to tax in the 
U.S. at the latest when it was repatriated. This encouraged U.S. MNEs to retain profits 
abroad in order to defer U.S. taxation.11 Under the new tax system based on territoriality, in 
principle only income generated in the U.S. is subject to U.S. tax, and dividends paid by 
foreign subsidiaries to their U.S. parents are fully deductible under the participation 
exemption rule provided that certain conditions are met.12 
Apart from the general impact, the TCJA is also assumed to have a direct impact in the field 
of international taxation, as it broadly addresses issues that were originally discussed in the 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project carried out between 2013 and 2015 by the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and G20 countries. 
Indeed, the OECD has acknowledged that the TCJA constitutes a comprehensive attempt to 
address the challenges identified in the BEPS Action Plan and that the U.S. has gone a long 
way in implementing BEPS measures.13 Many provisions introduced as part of the TCJA 
                                                 
9 This has also been noted by commentators, who have considered that the simplification of the tax system 
does not seem to have had a central role in the tax reform. See Viitala – Ahonen 2018 p. 6.  
10 Several provisions of the TCJA contain a so called sunset clause, i.e. they are temporarily in force, because 
the TCJA was enacted through the budget reconciliation process. This allowed the Republicans to pass the bill 
alone with a simple majority and with no votes from the Democrats. However, pursuant to the so called Byrd 
Rule stipulated in Section 313 of the Congressional Budget Act, the reconciliation bill cannot add to the federal 
deficit outside of the application period of the bill, which is typically 10 years. In their 2018 budget proposal, 
the Senate Budget Committee allowed for USD 1.5 trillion deficit. Thus, the TCJA needed to be drafted in a 
manner that its ultimate financial impact would remain within the limits set out by the Senate. 
11 According to a presented estimation, the Fortune 500 Companies held up to USD 2.6 trillion offshore in 
2017, prior to the enactment of the TCJA. See ITEP 2017 p. 1. 
12 Pursuant to Section 245A and Section 246(c)(5), the qualification for participation exemption requires that 
the U.S. shareholder has held at least 10% of the stock of the foreign corporation for at least 366 consecutive 
days. 
13 OECD Economic Survey of the U.S. 2018 p. 47; Aldonas 2019 p. 877. 
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prevent base erosion and profit shifting. However, the tax reform also contains protectionist 
features.14 These features have already led to discussions on whether the tax reform is fully 
in conformity with all international commitments. Furthermore, it remains to be seen 
whether these changes adopted by the U.S. could lead to countermeasures and more fierce 
tax competition between countries. 
The introduction of participation exemption could lead to inappropriate offshoring and tax 
base erosion. To balance the situation, the TCJA also introduced several provisions to 
discourage such activities. With regard to income generated from intangibles, the most 
significant amendments are the GILTI provision, which stands for Global Intangible Low 
Taxed Income, and the FDII provision, standing for Foreign Derived Intangible Income. 
This study focuses on these two provisions.  
Under the GILTI provision, interpreted as the “stick”, U.S. shareholders of controlled 
foreign companies (CFC) shall be taxed on the income of their CFCs that exceeds the 
deemed return on CFCs’ tangible assets, i.e. the remaining income that is deemed to be 
derived from intangibles. The other side of the coin is the FDII provision, which constitutes 
the “carrot”. Pursuant to the FDII provision, foreign income of U.S. corporations deemed to 
be generated from intangible-related foreign sales may be partially deducted and is thus 
taxed at a lower effective CIT rate in the U.S. Together these provisions aim to encourage 
intangible investments and holding of intangibles in the U.S. and prevent their offshoring. 
1.2 Scope of the Study 
In this study, the taxation of intangible income, cross-border tax planning, and international 
taxation will be examined in light of the newly introduced GILTI and FDII provisions. First, 
the objective is to clarify how intangible income is taxed under these provisions. Second, the 
possible impact of GILTI and FDII provisions on U.S. MNEs and their cross-border tax 
planning will be analyzed in more detail. 
Finally, due to the cross-border nature of the topic, the study aims to recognize possible 
implications from European point of view. It will be examined whether the provisions violate 
certain international commitments in the field of tax and trade policies and what is the impact 
of the provisions on the development of international taxation. Specific attention will be paid 
                                                 
14 Viitala – Ahonen 2018 p. 13. 
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to whether the FDII provision could be considered to constitute a harmful tax regime or a 
prohibited export subsidy. On the other hand, it will be also analyzed whether European 
countries are under pressure to provide similar tax incentives or take other countermeasures 
in order to keep up their position in the tax competition. In this context, the FDII provision 
will be shortly compared with patent box systems provided by various EU Member States. 
In summary, this study focuses on the following research questions: 
1. How do the GILTI and FDII provisions affect the taxation of income generated from 
intangibles? 
2. How do the GILTI and FDII provisions possibly impact the tax planning of U.S. 
MNEs in the future? 
3. What implications could the results to the first and second research question have 
from European point of view and how could European countries react to them? 
The research will be carried out first from U.S. point of view, as the focus will lie on the 
effects of the amendments on taxation and tax planning of U.S. MNEs. Later on, attention 
will be paid to potential implications abroad. In this context, European point of view will be 
adopted. 
1.3 Research Methods and Sources of Law 
The legal dogmatic method has been selected as the main research method in this study. 
Hence, the study constitutes a legal study where the aim is to systemize and interpret existing 
legal norms, de lege lata.15 The systematization of legal norms forms the theoretical legal 
dogmatic method, whereas the interpretation, the purpose of which is to present justified 
statements on the interpretation of the law, represents the practical side of the method.16 
Tax law is also strongly influenced by various non-legal factors, which may affect both the 
stipulation of the law and how it is interpreted. Tax planning, fiscal interests, and other tax-
motivated factors are clearly attached to the topic of this study. Thus, the topic will be 
analyzed also from a broader economic and political point of view, taking into consideration 
                                                 
15 Hirvonen 2011 p. 22. 
16 Aarnio 1997 p. 36–37. 
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for example various incentives behind stipulated tax legislation, possibilities in cross-border 
tax planning, and tax competition between countries. 
In addition, comparative legal method is used where applicable. Legal comparison will be 
conducted in assessing whether the FDII provision and tax incentives it provides for U.S. 
MNEs differ from the tax incentives offered by certain EU Member States. Taking into 
consideration the purpose of the comparison, the comparative research of this study is brief 
and simplified. It will be carried out on micro level and can be characterized as multilateral 
and purely functional.17 
The main source of law in this research is naturally the TCJA and, more specifically, the 
GILTI and FDII provisions. Furthermore, attention will be paid to official documentation 
issued at the time of enactment and afterwards, the purpose of which is to clarify and specify 
the TCJA and said provisions. As the study concerns a recent legislative amendment, there 
is not yet case law in this regard. However, the implications of the TCJA have already been 
discussed by various commentators in legal literature, and the literature will thus be an 
essential source for this study. 
Furthermore, international sources will be exploited when analyzing the topic from a more 
global perspective. Specific attention will be paid to OECD BEPS reports and other relevant 
documentation issued by the OECD, as well as the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) 
Agreement of Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement). Additionally, 
attention will be paid to relevant domestic legislation when analyzing certain European 
patent box systems for the purpose of a legal comparison.  
1.4 Outline of the Study 
The study begins with an overview of intangibles in Chapter 2. The definition of intangibles 
as well as their transfer and valuation will be covered shortly to provide a general perception 
of intangibles. In addition, recent U.S. case law and changes with regard to valuation and 
identification of intangibles will be discussed. The examination of intangibles at a general 
level serves as background information for following chapters. 
                                                 
17 Husa 2013 p. 125–130; 134–136; and 145–156. 
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The GILTI and FDII provisions will be described in detail in Chapter 3. The purpose of this 
chapter is to lay out legal framework and clarify how the provisions affect the taxation of 
intangible income. Thus, the first research question will be replied to in this chapter. Specific 
attention will be paid to how the income treated as GILTI or FDII is calculated and how it 
is effectively taxed. 
In Chapter 4, preliminary results obtained in the previous Chapter 3 will be further examined 
in light of tax planning. The chapter will focus on how the GILTI and FDII provisions could 
impact tax planning carried out by U.S. MNEs. The aim is to identify any possible incentives 
and disincentives that the provisions could have in tax planning. The second research 
question will be replied to in chapter 4. 
After examining the topic from U.S. perspective, European point of view will be adopted in 
Chapter 5. The focus of the chapter will lie on analyzing GILTI and FDII provisions and 
their influence on tax planning, i.e. the answers to the first and second research question 
obtained in Chapters 3 and 4, correspondingly, at a more global level. The FDII provision 
and its international impact will be examined in more detail in light of international tax and 
trade policies. For this purpose, the chapter will include a brief legal comparison between 
the FDII provision and certain European patent box systems. In addition, it is examined how 
the GILTI provision could influence the future international taxation. The chapter will 
provide a reply to the third research question. 
The study ends with a conclusion in Chapter 6. The chapter contains further analysis of the 
information obtained in this study, concluding remarks, and a glance into the future. 
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2 Definition, Transfer, and Valuation of Intangibles 
2.1 Definition 
Intangibles are literally items we cannot touch. A more accurate definition of intangibles 
depends widely on the scope and context. There are also multiple similar terms such as 
intellectual assets, intellectual property, intangible assets, and intangible property, which can 
have the same, similar, or overlapping meaning. In this chapter, intangibles are discussed 
purely in legal and tax context and the purpose of this chapter is not to provide an extensive 
analysis of intangibles but a simple definition and short introduction. For understanding 
better the underlying motives relating to the topic of this study, specific attention will be 
paid to recognition, valuation, and transfer of intangibles under the OECD and U.S. transfer 
pricing rules. 
Intangibles that are protected by certain established legal rights become intellectual property 
(IP). Thus, their possession becomes visible: being property means that the ownership of 
assets can be asserted over. On the other hand, not all intangibles may be protected by 
establishing legal rights. For example workforce has a central role in the MNEs’ success. 
However, while the staff is an intangible asset of an MNE, it is not property as it cannot be 
owned like other tangible or intangible items. The workforce can neither be subject to legal 
rights, but it does create ideas, products, and other items that may then be subject to legal 
rights. Thus, intellectual capital consists of both the workforce and the intellectual property, 
and it can be traded.18 
Intangibles have interesting features that distinguish them from other assets. For example, 
they can be exploited without being depleted. Thus, products created from intangibles 
typically result in higher earnings margins since production costs are lower.19 Basically 
anything that increases the value of a product or the company and is not a tangible or 
financial asset could be interpreted as an intangible. This means that there is also endless 
amount of different intangibles. For example, Wiederhold has presented 12 different 
categories of intangibles. These categories cover intangibles from trademarks and design 
                                                 
18 Wiederhold 2014 p. 3–4; 36; and 39–40. 
19 Wiederhold 2014 p. 35–36. 
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documents to competitive position and essential goodwill.20 Another illustration of various 
examples of intangibles is given by Alder & Sound and presented below in Figure 1. The 
illustration shows that all intellectual property rights (IPR) and intangible assets are 
intangibles, and all intellectual property rights are intangible assets. However, not all 
intangible assets are IPR and not all intangibles are intangible assets or IPR. 
 
  
 
 
Figure 1. Intellectual Property Rights, Intangible Assets, and Intangibles. 
Photo credit: Alder & Sound. 
 
Both the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (OECD TPG) and U.S. tax legislation contain 
a definition of intangibles. Pursuant to Paragraph 6.6 of the OECD TPG, intangible is any 
asset which is not physical or financial; which is capable of being owned or controlled for 
use in commercial activities; and whose use or transfer would be compensated had it 
                                                 
20 The 12 categories listed by Wiederhold are as follows: personnel or workforce; unique business and technical 
development and manufacturing processes; essential goodwill; trademarks, including Internet domain names; 
competitive position; orders; exclusive contracts; valuable contracts; research and development completed or 
acquired; research and development currently in process, including acquired R&D; design documents; and 
software and databases. See Wiederhold 2014 p. 52. 
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occurred in a transaction between independent parties in comparable circumstances. It is 
explicitly mentioned that, instead of focusing on accounting or legal definitions, the thrust 
of a transfer pricing analysis in a case involving intangibles should be the determination of 
the conditions that would be agreed upon between independent parties for a comparable 
transaction. Thus, intangibles have been given a broad definition and basically any assets 
that meet with the three conditions can be treated as intangibles, the transfer or use of which 
should be compensated between related parties. To illustrate the various types of different 
intangibles, the OECD TPG also shortly presents eight different categories of intangibles21, 
accompanied by a remark that the list is not even meant to be comprehensive. 
Compared with the OECD TPG definition, intangible property has been given a slightly 
more accurate statutory definition in the U.S. tax legislation, although the scope remains 
wide. Pursuant to Section 936(h)(3)(B), the term “intangible property” means any (i) patent, 
invention, formula, process, design, pattern, or know-how; (ii) copyright, literary, musical, 
or artistic composition; (iii) trademark, trade name, or brand name; (iv) franchise, license, 
or contract; (v) method, program, system, procedure, campaign, survey, study, forecast, 
estimate, customer list, or technical data; (vi) any goodwill, going concern value, or 
workforce in place (including its composition and terms and conditions (contractual or 
otherwise) of its employment); or (vii) any other item the value or potential value of which 
is not attributable to tangible property or the services of any individual. 
Subparagraphs (vi) and (vii), which significantly broaden the definition, were recently 
amended as part of the TCJA. Unlike the definition given in the OECD TPG, the definition 
in the U.S. tax legislation begins with a detailed listing of intangibles. However, especially 
the residual category of subparagraph (vii) covering any similar item in fact broadens the 
scope to cover basically any assets the value of which is not attributable to tangible property 
or services of individual. Thus, these two definitions can be considered to be more or less 
identical. 
                                                 
21 These categories are patents; know-how and trade secrets; trademarks, trade names and brands; rights under 
contracts and government licenses; licenses and similar limited rights in intangibles; goodwill and ongoing 
concern value; group synergies; and market specific characteristics. See Paragraphs 6.18–6.31 of the OECD 
TPG. 
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2.2 Recognition and Valuation in Transferring Intangibles 
The definition of intangibles is of relevance especially when intangibles are being transferred 
and need to be recognized. The transfer of intangibles has become of particular interest in 
taxation due to various reasons. First, they have increasing role in the business and value 
creation. Second, they are also easy to transfer at least on paper. On the other hand, endless 
types of different intangibles also makes it hard for taxpayers to recognize and value 
intangibles, and thus additional guidance is required. 
Typically the transfer of IP within an MNE takes place in form of licensing, which allows 
several group companies to exploit the same IP in their business. All or majority of the IP of 
an MNE may also be centralized in an IP holding or principal company, the (possibly sole) 
purpose of which is to hold, administer, and control the IP. The company then grants licenses 
to operative group companies, allowing them to exploit the same IP in their business. The 
centralization has many redeeming features, such as easier management and protection of 
the intangibles.22 Furthermore, since the IP holding company is typically located in a low 
tax jurisdiction, the centralization, sale, and licensing of intangibles in intra-group 
transactions are also efficient tax planning and profit shifting tools for MNEs. On the other 
hand, group companies may also exploit other common intangibles apart from IP. However, 
under the OECD TPG, an appropriate compensation should be paid for the use of any 
intangible. 
Valuation methods are used to determine an appropriate compensation for intangibles 
subject to transfer or exploitation. When it comes to transactions between unrelated parties, 
the value agreed upon is based on negotiations. The parties would not have any incentive to 
pay over or receive less than the market value of intangibles, so called arm’s length value. 
Thus, the valuation of intangible assets is generally simple and in conformity with market 
conditions. 
However, between related parties, typically companies belonging to the same group of 
companies, specific attention needs to be paid to the valuation of intangibles. As stated out 
in Paragraph 6 of the OECD TPG, the starting points in the OECD TPG are the separate 
entity approach and the arm’s length principle. In addition, under the OECD TPG, the 
compensations paid in intra-group sales and licensing need be at arm’s length. This prevents 
                                                 
22 Penttilä – Isomaa-Myllymäki 2018 p. 82–83. 
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profit shifting from one company and country to another. According to the arm’s length 
principle set forth in Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention (MTC), if the conditions 
between related parties in their commercial or financial relations deviate from those which 
would have been made between independent parties, the transaction may be adjusted and the 
parties taxed accordingly. For this purpose, the OECD TPG presents several valuation 
methods, the suitability of which depend on the situation at hand.23 However, finding the 
right arm’s length value and even recognizing all the intangibles involved may be very 
challenging.  
The U.S. tax legislation also stipulates valuation of intangibles and possible adjustments in 
transfers. Adjustments may be made in related party transactions under Section 482, which 
stipulates allocation of income and deductions between related taxpayers. In addition, it was 
recently amended by the TCJA that transfers of intangible property may be required to be 
valued on an aggregate basis or on the basis of realistic alternatives, if that is considered to 
be the most reliable means of valuation for such transfers. This implies that there is a strong 
tendency to regard the transferred intangibles as a whole, which typically increases their 
overall value. 
2.3 Recent Changes 
International taxation has been greatly influenced by the recent OECD BEPS Project, which 
took place between 2013 and 2015. One of the key issues under discussion in the OECD 
BEPS was the alignment of allocation of profits with the economic activities producing 
profits, i.e. value creation. The conclusions regarding this matter were published in BEPS 
Action 8–10 Final Report. As for intangibles, the report explicitly states that the legal owner 
of intangibles should no longer be automatically entitled to the accrued return generated by 
those intangibles. Instead, group companies performing important functions, contributing 
assets, and controlling economically significant risks should be entitled to an appropriate 
                                                 
23 The OECD TPG mentions the comparable uncontrolled price method, the resale price method, and the cost 
plus method, which are traditional transaction methods, and in addition transactional net margin method and 
the transactional profit split method, which are transactional profit methods. Pursuant to Paragraph 2.2 of the 
OECD TPG, the selection of a method depends inter alia on the nature of the controlled transaction, the 
availability of reliable information, and how appropriate the application of each method, taking into account 
their recognized strengths and weaknesses, would be with regard to the transaction. For more information on 
these methods, see Chapter II (p. 97–146) of the OECD TPG. 
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return that reflects the value of their contributions.24 The underlying aim is to ensure that the 
profits will accrue and be taxed where the people and other assets generating the profit are 
located. 
The suggestions presented in the BEPS Action 8–10 final report were amended to the latest 
version of the OECD TPG25 in 2017. Consequently, pursuant to Paragraph 6.32 of the OECD 
TPG, the ownership of intangibles and allocation of profit generated from intangibles are 
subject to extensive analysis, where attention is paid to the parties’ performed functions, 
used assets, and assumed risks. Specific attention is paid to so called DEMPE functions, 
standing for the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of 
intangibles. Hence, although the legal rights and contractual arrangements are still the 
starting point pursuant to Paragraph 6.35 of the OECD TPG, contributions by other group 
members entitle them to a compensation. 
The above has to be taken into consideration in the exploitation and transfer of intangibles, 
too. Thus, the mere transfer of legal ownership is no longer sufficient. For the recipient to 
be entitled to all profits generated from intangibles, the actual functions, assets, and risks 
related thereto, i.e. economic substance, must also be transferred. The introduction of 
DEMPE functions is especially relevant for the MNEs that have implemented principal or 
IP holding company structures.26 
With regard to the valuation of intangibles in outbound restructurings and intercompany 
pricing under the U.S. tax legislation, the TCJA amended Sections 367(d) and 482 by adding 
a realistic alternative principle clause. Pursuant to this new clause, the valuation of transfers 
of intangible property shall be made on an aggregate basis or on the basis of realistic 
alternatives, if it is determined that such basis is the most reliable means of valuation of 
certain transfer. The purpose of the aggregate approach is to take into consideration the 
additional value resulting from the interrelation of intangible assets where appropriate. In 
addition, the realistic alternative principle is based on the assumption that a taxpayer will 
only enter into a certain transaction if none of its realistic alternatives is economically 
preferable.27 
                                                 
24 BEPS Action Plan 8–10 p. 10. 
25 See Paragraph 19 of the OECD TPG. 
26 See in-depth analysis of the amendment’s impact on IP holding company structures, Penttilä – Isomaa-
Myllymäki 2018. 
27 Conference Report 2017 p. 661–662. 
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Both TCJA amendments, the broadened scope of intangibles and the realistic alternative 
principle, aim to limit base erosion and profit shifting by means of intangible property 
transfers. As a consequence, the amendments can be expected increase the overall value of 
intangibles subject to transfer or licensing. In addition, the Conference Report explicitly 
mentions that these amendments were introduced in response to certain controversies arisen 
in case law.28 For example, there has been case law where the consideration of workforce as 
an intangible asset and subsequent duty to compensate for it as well as the use of realistic 
alternatives have been denied despite the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) attempts. 
In Amazon v. Commissioner, where the Tax Court issued opinion in March 2017, Amazon 
US had granted Amazon Lux the right to use certain pre-existing intangible assets in Europe 
by entering into a cost sharing arrangement (CSA). The buy-in payment was determined 
based on the comparable uncontrolled transaction method. However, the IRS argued that the 
discounted cash flow (DCF) method should have been used instead based of the aggregation 
of transactions. Consequently, the buy-in payment would have been based on the enterprise 
value for Amazon’s European business instead of the separate intangible assets transferred 
under the CSA, and thus result in a significantly higher buy-in payment. The Tax Court held 
that such approach was not appropriate as it included the value of many items that were not 
treated as intangibles under the former legislation. Namely, these assets were workforce in 
place, going concern value, and goodwill.29  
Moreover, the IRS could not justify its approach by referring to the “realistic alternatives” 
principle. The company had been entitled to make the cost sharing election under the law 
and the opted structure did not lack economic substance. Thus, the IRS was not allowed to 
replace the structure opted by Amazon US based on the fact that the company had had 
realistic alternative available to it.30 This was in line with the Tax Court’s previous view in 
Veritas v. Commissioner, where the Tax Court held that the IRS was not authorized to 
determine the buy-in payment of a CSA by using the DCF or income method and thus 
aggregating the transactions and treating them as a sale.31 
As the opinions issued by the Tax Court have precedential value, their alignments would 
have established how similar transfers of intangibles shall be valued, had the TCJA 
                                                 
28 Conference Report 2017 p. 661–662. 
29 Amazon v. Commissioner 2017 p. 78–80. 
30 Amazon v. Commissioner 2017 p. 82–84. 
31 Veritas v. Commissioner 2009 p. 40–41. 
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amendments not been introduced. Thus, it seems that the legislator has been keen to change 
the legal praxis by introducing these “missing” stipulations in the IRC. It can be assumed 
that these amendments will significantly influence the transfer of intangibles and their 
valuation. As a result of the amendments, in the future transfers of intangibles can be 
expected to be treated more frequently as a whole instead of separate intangibles, and this 
often leads to higher total value.32 Hence, the amendments discourage transfer of intangibles 
and make the estimation of real arm’s length value challenging. 
                                                 
32 Viitala – Ahonen 2018 p. 11.  
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3 GILTI and FDII Provisions 
3.1 Global Intangible Low Taxed Income 
3.1.1 U.S. Shareholder and CFC 
The most significant amendments of the TCJA concerning the taxation of income derived 
from intangibles are undisputedly the GILTI and FDII provisions. The provision regarding 
global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI) is stipulated in Section 951A. Pursuant to 
Section 951A(a), each person who is a U.S. shareholder of any controlled foreign 
corporation (CFC) for any taxable year shall include in gross income the shareholder’s global 
intangible low-taxed income for the year. 
Whether a U.S. person is considered shareholder of a CFC is determined separately for each 
taxable year of the CFC which ends in or with taxable year of such U.S. shareholder. 
Pursuant to Section 951(b), U.S. shareholder refers to a U.S. person who owns at least 10% 
of the total combined voting power of such foreign corporation or at least 10% of the total 
value of shares of such foreign corporation. Based on the definition given in Section 957(a), 
a CFC is any foreign corporation where more than 50% of the total combined voting power 
or the total value of the stock is owned or considered as owned by U.S. shareholders on any 
day during the taxable year of such foreign corporation. Pursuant to Section 951A(e)(2), a 
person shall be treated as U.S. shareholder of a CFC for any taxable year of such person if 
the person owns stock in such foreign corporation on the last day in the taxable year of such 
foreign corporation, on which such foreign corporation is a CFC. A foreign corporation shall 
be treated as CFC for any taxable year if such foreign corporation is a CFC at any time 
during such taxable year.  
The GILTI provision creates a new type of income of CFCs alongside subpart F income and 
concerns all U.S. shareholders of CFCs, despite the legal form of the U.S. shareholder. The 
GILTI provision is applied to the CFCs’ taxable years of foreign corporations beginning 
after December 31, 2017, and to taxable years of U.S. shareholders in which or with which 
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such taxable years of foreign corporations end.33 Consequently, the GILTI provision will be 
first applied in the taxation carried out in 2019. 
3.1.2 Calculation of GILTI 
Pursuant to Section 951A(b)(1), GILTI means the excess, if any, of a U.S. shareholder’s net 
CFC tested income for a taxable year over the net deemed tangible income return of the same 
shareholder for the same taxable year. This is illustrated in the figure below: 
 
 
Figure 2. Global Intangible Low Taxed Income. 
 
Pursuant to Section 951A(c), the net CFC tested income refers to the excess, if any, of the 
aggregate of the U.S. shareholder’s pro rata share of the tested income of each CFC over the 
aggregate of such shareholder’s pro rata share of the tested loss of each CFC. The 
calculations based on pro rata shares are conducted in the same manner as the calculation of 
subpart F income, i.e. under the rules of Section 951(a)(2). 
                                                 
33 Conference Report 2017 p. 163. 
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The tested income in turn means, with respect to any CFC for any taxable year, the excess 
of gross income over the deductions, including taxes, allocable to such gross income. The 
gross income is taken into account without regard to certain categories of income which 
would skew the calculation. The categories to be excluded from gross income in the 
calculation of tested income are for example the subpart F income and dividend received 
from a related person.34 The tested loss has the opposite meaning, i.e. it refers to the excess, 
if any, of deductions, including taxes, properly allocable to the gross income over that gross 
income with respect to any CFC for any taxable year.  
Pursuant to Section 951A(b)(2), the net deemed tangible income return (NDTIR) means the 
excess of 10 percent of the aggregate of the U.S. shareholder’s pro rata share of the qualified 
business asset investment (QBAI) of each CFC.35 It is calculated over the amount of interest 
expense to the extent the interest income attributable to such expense is not taken into 
account in determining the shareholder’s net CFC tested income. Thus, the NDTIR is 
basically a deemed 10% routine return on the QBAI. 
The qualified business asset investment (QBAI) refers to the specified tangible property, i.e. 
any tangible property used in the production of tested income, used in a trade or business of 
the corporation and of a type with respect to which a deduction is allowable under Section 
167. The QBAI is calculated based on the average of the CFC’s aggregate adjusted bases as 
of the close of each quarter of the taxable year. In case of dual use property, i.e. property 
used both in the production of tested income and other income, the property shall be treated 
as specified tangible property in the same proportion that the tested income produced with 
respect to such property bears to the total gross income produced with respect to such 
property. 
It is an interesting feature that the amount of GILTI is essentially calculated on an aggregate 
basis and not separately for each CFC of a U.S. shareholder. The initial calculations, i.e. the 
                                                 
34 The entire list of categories to be deducted from gross income for the purpose of calculating the tested income 
pursuant to Section 951A(c)(2)(A)(i) is as follows: any item of income described in Section 952(b); any gross 
income taken into account in determining the subpart F income; any gross income excluded from the foreign 
base company income (as defined in Section 954) and the insurance income (as defined in Section 953) by 
reason of Section 954(b)(4); any dividend received from a related person (as defined in Section 954(d)(3); and 
any foreign oil and gas extraction income (as defined in Section 907(c)(1). 
35 Some have considered that the 10% deemed return on tangible assets is quite high. However, it has also been 
pointed out that, taken into consideration that the GILTI provision does not allow carryforward to balance the 
amount of GILTI each year, the expected 10% rate of return on equity is actually not that excessive. See Singh 
– Mathur 2018 p. 16–18. 
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amount of tested income or tested loss as well as the QBAI are conducted separately for each 
CFC. However, the NDTIR as well as the net CFC tested income, which ultimately 
determine the amount of GILTI, are taken into consideration in the aggregate. This might 
have a neutralizing effect on the final GILTI tax, but it may also skew the final result, as it 
allows pooling and encourages U.S. MNEs to operate both in high-tax jurisdictions and tax 
havens to offset the GILTI tax.36 
Pursuant to Section 951A(d)(4), the Secretary is entitled to issue regulations or other 
guidance for the purpose of preventing the avoidance of the purposes of the subsection 
concerning QBAI. It has been particularly mentioned that such regulations could provide for 
the treatment of property if such property is transferred or held temporarily, or if the 
avoidance of the purposes of the paragraph is a factor in the transfer or holding of such 
property. 
As expected, the Proposed GILTI Regulations released in September 2018 addressed QBAI 
anti-abuse rules alongside other guidance and narrowed the accumulation of QBAI under 
certain circumstances. Pursuant to Section 1.951A-3(h)(1) of Proposed GILTI Regulations, 
specified tangible property is disregarded in determining the QBAI if the CFC acquires it 
with a principal purpose of reducing the GILTI inclusion amount and holds the property 
temporarily but over at least one quarter end. For purposes of this paragraph, property held 
for less than 12 months including at least one quarter end, is treated as temporarily held and 
acquired with a principal purpose of reducing the GILTI inclusion amount of a U.S. 
shareholder. Moreover, pursuant to Section 1.951A-3(h)(2), a transfer of any specified 
tangible property transferred by one CFC to another CFC during the period after December 
31, 2017 and before the transferor CFC’s first year to which the GILTI provision applies, 
will be disregarded in the calculation of the transferee CFC’s QBAI. As a final note, Section 
1.951A-1(d)(3)(ii) stipulates a special limitation rule for preferred stock in case of excess 
QBAI, according to which the amount of QBAI is limited to 10 times the tested income. 
Together, these proposed regulations limit the interpretation of QBAI and prevent the misuse 
of the subsection. 
                                                 
36 Harris – Looney 2018 p. 14; Clausing 2018 p. 19. 
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3.1.3 Taxation of GILTI 
It results from the inclusion of GILTI to the U.S. shareholder’s gross income that the amount 
of GILTI is subject to tax in the U.S. For U.S. MNEs, it means that the GILTI would be 
subject to CIT at the rate of 21%. However, a deduction is allowed under Section 250(a), 
pursuant to which a domestic corporation is allowed to deduct 50% of the GILTI included 
in the gross income of such domestic corporation under Section 951A. This leads to an 
effective tax rate of 10.5% on income treated as GILTI. The deduction rate shall be reduced 
to 37.5% for taxable years after 2025 pursuant to Section 250(a)(3)(B). Consequently, the 
amount of GILTI, if any, will be effectively taxed at the rate of 13.125% in taxable years 
after 2025. 
In addition, domestic corporations as U.S. shareholders of CFCs are entitled to a foreign tax 
credit (FTC) corresponding to 80% of the taxes that have been paid abroad for the income 
treated as GILTI.37 Pursuant to Section 960(d), such domestic corporations shall be deemed 
to have paid foreign income taxes equal to 80 percent of the product of such domestic 
corporation’s inclusion percentage multiplied by the aggregate tested foreign income taxes 
paid or accrued by CFCs. The inclusion percentage means the ratio of the corporation’s 
GILTI divided by the aggregate amount of the tested income of the CFCs. The tested foreign 
income taxes mean foreign income taxes paid or accrued by such foreign corporation, which 
are properly attributable to the tested income of such foreign corporation, taken into account 
by the domestic corporation under the GILTI provision. 
The 80% FTC for GILTI is separate from other foreign tax credits.38 In other words, foreign 
taxes on other income than GILTI cannot be resorted to in the taxation of GILTI. The FTC 
for GILTI means that the amount of GILTI is not in principle taxed in the U.S. if the same 
income has already been taxed at the rate of 13.125% or higher by a foreign jurisdiction.39 
According to Section 1.960 of the Proposed FTC Regulations, the FTC for GILTI is 
calculated strictly and only such foreign income taxes of a CFC that are associated with the 
                                                 
37 Interestingly, even though the GILTI provision applies to all U.S. shareholders of CFCs, irrespective of 
whether the shareholder is for example a C corporation, an S corporation or an individual, only domestic 
corporations are entitled to foreign tax credit. This presumably decreases the attractiveness of using a C 
corporation instead of an S corporation in the future. 
38 There are now in total five categories for CFC’s gross income, i.e. the general category income, the passive 
category income, the GILTI, the foreign branch income, and the specified separate categories, e.g. treaty 
resourced income. See Section 904. 
39 However, this is not always the case in practice due to the calculation formulas being essentially based on 
aggregate amounts. 
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GILTI inclusion amount of a domestic corporation as the CFC’s U.S. shareholder or with 
previously taxed earnings and profits are eligible to be deemed paid.  
An interesting feature of the GILTI is that the taxation is carried out at the level of the U.S. 
shareholders, but the taxation of GILTI does not require the CFCs to actually distribute 
profits to their U.S. shareholders. It means that the taxation is not triggered at the moment 
of profit distribution and it may not be deferred. On the contrary, the amount of GILTI shall 
be included in the gross income of U.S. shareholders on a yearly basis. Thus, the taxation of 
GILTI follows the logic of the subpart F income of the CFCs, the taxation of which has been 
stipulated in Section 951. 
3.2 Foreign Derived Intangible Income 
Whereas the GILTI provision applies to all U.S. persons that are U.S. shareholders of CFCs, 
the FDII provision applies to all U.S. corporations. Pursuant to Section 250(a), a U.S. 
corporation is allowed to make a 37.5% deduction of the income treated as foreign derived 
intangible income (FDII). Taken into account the 21% CIT rate, the deduction means that 
income regarded as FDII is effectively taxed at the rate of 13.125%. 
The FDII provision is applied to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2017.40 
Consequently, the FDII provision will be first applied in the taxation carried out in 2019. In 
addition, it is stipulated in Section 250(a)(3)(A) that, for taxable years beginning after 2025, 
the deduction shall be made at the rate of 21.875% instead of 37.5%. Thus, the effective tax 
rate applicable to FDII will be 16.406% as of 2025. 
The definition of FDII and its calculation formula are stipulated in Section 250(b). 
According to the Section, FDII of a U.S. corporation is the amount bearing the same ratio to 
the deemed intangible income as the foreign derived deduction eligible income bears to the 
deduction eligible income. This is illustrated in the figure below: 
 
                                                 
40 Conference Report 2017 p. 167. 
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Figure 3. Foreign Derived Intangible Income. 
 
The definitions of the amounts of income used in the calculation of FDII have been defined 
in same Section 250(b). Firstly, pursuant to Section 250(b)(3), the deduction eligible income 
(DEI) refers to any excess of gross income over deductions, including taxes, allocable to 
such gross income. The gross income is taken into account without regard to certain 
categories of income that would skew the calculation. The categories to be excluded from 
the gross income of a corporation in the calculation of DEI are for example the amount of 
GILTI, dividend received from CFCs, and foreign branch income.41 
The foreign derived deduction eligible income (FDDEI) is any deduction eligible income 
derived in connection with property, which is sold to a non-U.S. person and is for a foreign 
use, or services which are provided to any person or with respect to property not located 
within the U.S. The foreign use means any use, consumption, or disposition not within the 
U.S. The income derived from sale of property or provision of services to domestic 
intermediaries, i.e. non-related parties located within the U.S., is not treated as FDDEI even 
if the purchaser uses the property for a foreign use or the acquired services in providing 
services that are treated as FDDEI. 
Related party transactions are examined more strictly and not treated in principle as for a 
foreign use, unless specific requirements are met. Pursuant to Section 250(b)(5)(D), related 
party means any member of an affiliated group as defined in Section 1504(a).42 In addition, 
                                                 
41 The entire list of categories to be deducted from gross income for the purpose of calculating the DEI pursuant 
to Section 250(b)(3)(A)(i) is as follows: any amount included in the gross income under Section 951(a)(1); the 
GILTI included in the gross income under Section 951A; any financial services income as defined in Section 
904(d)(2)(D); any dividend received from a CFC of such domestic corporation; any domestic oil and gas 
extraction income; and any foreign branch income as defined in Section 904(d)(2)(J). 
42 Pursuant to Section 1504(a), affiliate groups are chains of includible corporations connected through stock 
ownership with a common parent corporation, where the common parent owns directly stock meeting the 80-
percent voting and value test as stipulated in Section 1504(a)(2) in at least one of the other includible 
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any person other than a corporation shall be treated as a member of such group if such person 
is controlled by members of such group or controls any such member.43 Thus, a sale of 
property to a related non-U.S. party is not for a foreign use unless such property is ultimately 
sold by the related party, or used by the related party in connection with property which is 
sold or the provision of services, to another person who is an unrelated non-U.S. party and 
such property is for a foreign use. A service provided to a related non-U.S. party is treated 
as for a foreign use only if the taxpayer can show that the service is not substantially similar 
to services provided by such related party to persons located within the U.S. 
Finally, pursuant to Section 250(b)(2), the deemed intangible income (DII) refers to the 
excess of deduction eligible income defined above over the deemed tangible income return 
of the corporation. The deemed tangible income return follows the formula used for 
calculating the amount of GILTI, and is thus 10% of the corporation’s qualified business 
asset investment as defined in relation to GILTI Section 951A(d). That is, the same definition 
of QBAI as well as the same amount of deemed 10 % return on the QBAI are applied in the 
calculation of both GILTI and FDII. 
The Proposed FDII Regulations provide an anti-avoidance rule in Section 1.250(b)-2(h), 
pursuant to which certain transfers are disregarded when calculating DII and QBAI for the 
purposes of the FDII of a domestic corporation. The transfer shall be disregarded if a 
domestic corporation, with a principal purpose of decreasing the amount of its DII, transfers 
specified tangible property to a specified related party of the corporation and, within the 
disqualified period, the corporation or an FDII-eligible related party of the corporation leases 
the same or substantially similar property from any specified related party. In this case, the 
corporation is treated as owning the transferred property solely for purposes of determining 
the QBAI. The same applies to so called structured arrangements, i.e. arrangements where 
the other party is not a related party, if the reduction in the corporation’s deemed tangible 
income return is a material factor in the pricing of the arrangement with the transferee or if 
based on all the facts and circumstances, the reduction in the domestic corporation’s deemed 
                                                 
corporations, and stock meeting the same requirements set out in Section 1504(a)(2) in each of the includible 
corporations (except the common parent) is owned directly by one or more of the other includible corporations. 
It should be noted that the 80-percent threshold is significant, and thus the meaning of related party in this 
context is more restricted than for example the definition typically used e.g. in transfer pricing context. 
43 Pursuant to Section 954(d)(3), control means the ownership of stock possessing more than 50% of the total 
voting power or the ownership of more than 50% by value of the beneficial interests, depending on the legal 
form of the person subject to control. 
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tangible income return is a principal purpose of the arrangement. However, it is explicitly 
stated in the Proposed FDII Regulations that the anti-avoidance rule does not apply to 
transfers to and leases from with unrelated parties.44 
Based on the above, the amount of FDII is the share of all deemed intangible income  
corresponding to the ratio of foreign-derived deduction eligible income to the corporation’s 
overall deduction eligible income. However, this calculation method does not take into 
consideration the real source of the excess of deemed tangible income return. Nor does it  
acknowledge whether all income regarded as FDII are actually obtained abroad and actually 
derived from intangibles. 
3.3 Impact on Taxation of Intangible Income 
The purpose of the FDII provision is clearly to encourage the export of intangible-related 
goods and services. This is achieved by providing a right to deduction and thus a lower 
effective tax rate applicable to foreign-source intangible income of U.S. MNEs. Thus, the 
FDII provision forms an incentive for U.S. MNEs to have their intangibles to the U.S. instead 
of offshoring them. 
The other side of the coin, the GILTI provision, in turn aims to discourage the offshoring of 
intangibles to low tax jurisdictions. According to the provision, U.S. shareholders shall 
include in gross income any income of their CFCs that exceeds the deemed routine return 
on tangible assets. The GILTI provision thus creates a new taxable income category for 
CFCs and effectively complements the taxation of CFCs. After the adoption of the GILTI 
provision, the only CFC income streams not subject to U.S. taxation are the NDTIR, as it 
does not form part of GILTI, and income qualifying for the high tax exception to subpart F 
under Section 954(b)(4).45 
However, a deduction at the rate of 50% of the income treated as GILTI is allowed. In 
addition, U.S. shareholders are allowed to 80% foreign tax credit of taxes paid abroad, which 
are properly attributable to that income. Thus, GILTI is actually only taxed in the U.S. if the 
                                                 
44 Proposed FDII Regulations p. 18. 
45 Before the introduction of the GILTI provision, U.S. tax on any income received by CFCs could be deferred 
provided that it did not fall into one of the subpart F categories. The traditional subpart F categories are the 
foreign base company sales income, foreign personal holding company income, and foreign base company 
services income. See Kroll et al. 2018 p. 33. 
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same income has been taxed abroad at a low rate. In principle, if GILTI has been effectively 
taxed in the CFC’s resident country at least at the rate of 13.125%, no tax should be payable 
on the same income in the U.S.46 This means that the GILTI provision in fact creates a 
worldwide backstop or minimum tax for certain income accrued by CFCs of U.S. 
shareholders. 
It has been said that the GILTI and FDII provisions are meant to be scrutinized together, 
whereby their full impact can be analyzed. By providing certain incentives and creating other 
disincentives, together these provisions act as a carrot and a stick in the taxation of 
intangible-derived income. This is at least the intention of the provisions on paper. In 
addition, it has been pointed out that the provisions neutralize tax differences,  because 
foreign-source intangible income is always taxed at the same rate, i.e. 13.125%, despite of 
whether the intangibles are located in the U.S. or abroad.47 However, taking all factors into 
consideration, the provisions might involve also other implications. These real implications 
are analyzed more broadly and deeply from the point of view of U.S. MNEs in following 
Chapter 4. 
As a final note, the aim and impact of GILTI and FDII provisions may also be examined in 
context of the tax reform. Internationally, the key impact of the TCJA was the shift from 
worldwide to territorial taxation by introducing the participation exemption. In this light, it 
is said that the GILTI and FDII provisions actually complement the participation exemption 
by diminishing the incentive to offshoring intangible assets, which are already in principle 
easily transferred. In addition, the GILTI provision actually acts contrary to the participation 
exemption by implementing a kind of worldwide minimum tax on foreign income deemed 
to be derived from intangibles. 
                                                 
46 However, this does not apply in all situations in practice because there are various factors affecting the 
calculation of the amount of GILTI and FTC, inter alia the allocation of interest expenses and the fact that the 
GILTI is calculated on an aggregate basis. See Viitala – Ahonen 2018 p. 11. 
47 Aldonas 2019 p. 876. However, interestingly this does not apply to domestic intangible income, which is 
taxed at the federal CIT rate of 21%. 
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4 Impact on U.S. MNEs 
4.1 Incentives and Disincentives 
In light of previous Chapter 3, the initial assumptions regarding incentives and disincentives 
of FDII and GILTI provisions are clear. First, with regard to the FDII regime, the effective 
tax rate of 13.125% applicable to FDII can be considered quite low compared to the statutory 
CIT rate of 21% in the U.S. as well as the average corporate tax rate of 23.7% in OECD 
countries.48 Thus, the FDII regime clearly encourages U.S. MNEs to own intangibles and 
export goods and services related thereto.49 Albeit depending of the applicable foreign tax 
rate, it is obvious that under many circumstances the FDII provision could constitute a real 
incentive for U.S. MNEs to shift their intangible profits to be taxed in the U.S. Second, the 
GILTI regime voids attempts by U.S. MNEs to shift intangibles offshore in the hope that 
income deriving from those assets would be taxed at a low or even zero rate. Together the 
provisions seem to encourage the developing and holding of intangibles in the U.S. and to 
disincentivize locating of intangibles in foreign jurisdictions.50 
It has also been pointed out that, through a combined effect, the provisions ensure that the 
intangible income is always taxed at least at the rate of 13.125% regardless of whether the 
income is domestic-source or foreign-source. Thus, as mentioned above, the FDII and GILTI 
regimes together should in fact diminish any incentive to shift intangible investment and 
profits outside the U.S.51 This would be in line with the overall purpose of the TCJA, which 
has been considered as a response to the OECD BEPS project. It implies that the provisions 
seem to effectively combat base erosion and profit shifting by discouraging excessive 
offshoring and attracting investments in the U.S.  
However, despite the characterization of the GILTI provision as a “stick”, it also provides a 
significantly lower effective minimum tax rate compared to the domestic federal CIT rate of 
21%. Due to the lower rate as well as narrow tax base, the GILTI provision has been 
considered to be too generous in order to have an actual impact on U.S. MNEs.52 
                                                 
48 OECD Corporate Tax Statistics 2019 p. 11.  
49 Viitala – Ahonen 2018 p. 11; Singh – Mathur 2018 p. 18–20. 
50 Mintz 2018 p. 22 and 28. 
51 Aldonas 2019 p. 876. 
52 Harris – Looney 2018 p. 14. Harris – Looney suggest that the GILTI provision would better meet its objective 
of disincentivizing foreign investments if the minimum tax rate was increased to 15%, tangible equity 
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Consequently, even though the purpose of the GILTI regime and its global minimum tax is 
to discourage the operations abroad, the offshoring of intangibles could still result in lower 
taxation in some cases.53 
Furthermore, as the amount of GILTI is calculated on an aggregate basis, the U.S. MNEs 
can combine operations in higher tax countries and tax havens, and taxes paid in higher tax 
countries offset the minimum tax otherwise due on income obtained in tax havens. This has 
been considered to effectively incentivize the offshoring instead of repatriating.54 On the 
other hand, the effective tax rate provided under the FDII provision is not especially low 
compared to certain patent box regimes, as we will see in Chapter 5.2.2.  
Consequently, it is uncertain whether the original objectives of GILTI and FDII provisions 
are actually met. Various commentators have concluded that the provisions might not really 
have a huge influence on the U.S. MNEs’ tax planning or that they may even work in 
contrary to their objectives by incentivizing offshoring of assets and preserving profit 
shifting.55 The GILTI and FDII provisions are even said to create substantial distortions to 
the ownership of assets both in the U.S. and abroad.56 
As an interesting remark, the impact of the GILTI and FDII regimes does not limit to 
intangibles and income derived from intangibles. Due to the calculation methods applied in 
determining the amount of GILTI and FDII, the regimes are also expected to have significant 
impact on the location of tangible investments. This is because the calculation formulas do 
not take into consideration where the income really derives from. With regard to both GILTI 
and FDII, the calculation is based on the deemed 10% return on QBAI, and the exceeding 
amount is deemed to be derived from intangibles. Thus, it follows that the location of 
tangible assets, amount of income derived from such assets, as well as overall amount of 
domestic versus foreign income affect the final amount of FDII and GILTI. 
With regard to the GILTI, the provision could actually encourage profit shifting and 
offshoring of tangible assets in order to increase the amount of income exempted from 
                                                 
allowance was reduced from 10 percent to the rate applied to risk-free investments, and calculations were made 
on a country-by-country basis. 
53 Kroll et al. 2018 p. 38; Singh – Mathur 2018 p. 21–22. However, U.S. MNEs would also have to consider 
any other aspects such as transfer pricing consequences and other transaction costs, which might neutralize 
small differences. 
54 Clausing 2018 p. 19 and 27. 
55 For example Harris – Looney 2018 p. 14; Kysar 2018 p. 3. 
56 Dharmapala 2018 p. 1.  
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GILTI. On the other hand, the same incentives exist for the FDII regime, too: a decrease in 
domestic tangible assets of a corporation expectedly increases the share of foreign derived 
income and thus the exceeding share deemed to be derived from intangibles. Hence, U.S. 
MNEs could exploit these computational rules by offshoring tangible assets and onshoring 
intangible assets.57 
This has been recognized by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), which has explicitly 
stated that the GILTI and FDII provisions could together increase the incentive for U.S. 
MNEs to make tangible investments abroad. This would benefit U.S. MNEs under both 
provisions.58 Consequently, these provisions, the original aim of which was to encourage 
holding of intangibles in the U.S., could actually have an adverse impact with regard to the 
location choices related to tangible assets. It remains to be seen to which extent the U.S. 
MNEs will benefit from this possibility. However, it must be noted that a massive 
exploitation of offshoring tangible assets by U.S. MNEs would certainly increase the 
pressure to repeal the GILTI exemption as being harmful to the US economy.59 
The location choice of tangible investments has also a close relation with the location of 
workforce. It has been considered that, as a consequence of incentivizing U.S. MNEs to 
make tangible investments abroad, there could be outbound job migration.60 Indeed, the 
GILTI regime combined with the participation exemption can be seen to encourage U.S. 
MNEs to carry out activities related to tangible assets, such as manufacturing in factories, 
abroad in their CFCs.  
The GILTI and FDII regimes may likewise lead to exploitation of certain import and export 
patterns in order to benefit from a lower tax rate. For example importing and re-exporting of 
goods could possibly qualify for the lower effective tax rate provided by the FDII regime 
even if no significant modification took place in the U.S.61 Furthermore, based on the 
Conference Report, it is clear that at least the exporting of goods, modifying them, and 
consequently importing them back to the U.S. does qualify for the application of lower tax 
                                                 
57 Fensby 2018 p. 991. See also illustrative examples, Kysar 2018 p. 4–12 and 15. However, it must also be 
pointed out that there are other factors apart from the GILTI and FDII regimes that affect the location choice 
of intangibles. For example, new expensing rules were introduced as part of the TCJA, pursuant to which 
certain tangible investments made in the U.S. between 2018 and 2022 qualify for 100% expensing.  
58 CBO 2018 p. 109–110. 
59 Avi-Yonah 2018b p. 5.  
60 Avi-Yonah 2018a p. 6. 
61 Avi-Yonah – Vallespinos 2018 p. 6. 
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rate.62 The exploitation of these patterns, that maybe would not be carried out had there not 
been any tax incentive for that, is hardly a desirable outcome in the long run. Ultimately, the 
GILTI and FDII regimes provide U.S. MNEs with possibilities to benefit from lower tax 
rates compared to other U.S. corporations which do not operate abroad. This could 
encourage domestic U.S. corporations to offshore part of their business. 
The area and type of business as well as the location choice affect the final impact of the 
GILTI regime. Depending on the CFCs, the impact may be greater or smaller. The more 
QBAI the CFC has, the more income is exempted from GILTI, resulting effectively in lower 
amount of GILTI. This clearly favors U.S. shareholders of CFCs whose business relies 
heavily on tangible assets. On the contrary, CFCs operating as holding or financing 
companies or for example in the high tech industry, where most of the assets consist of 
intangibles, have hard time avoiding the impact of GILTI. Additionally, taxes paid for the 
income abroad entitle to foreign tax credit and thus determine whether the exceeding amount 
of income treated as GILTI is ultimately taxed in U.S. As it has been stated above, if the 
GILTI has been effectively taxed at the rate if 13.125%, the foreign tax credit should in 
principle be sufficient to avoid any additional taxation on the same income in the U.S.63  
Yet another interesting aspect that can be assumed to affect U.S. MNEs and their willingness 
to rely on the FDII and GILTI regimes are the uncertainties relating to their permanence. 
The GILTI and FDII provisions were enacted for an undetermined period of time. However, 
they could be amended or repealed at any time depending on domestic political situation and 
fiscal needs. In addition, foreign countries have raised questions as to whether the FDII 
regime in fact complies with international tax and trade policies especially in light of the 
commitments made in the OECD and WTO. These doubts will be discussed in more detail 
from Europe’s point of view in following Chapter 5. However, it can be stated here that 
consequently U.S. MNEs might be reluctant to make investment and other decisions solely 
based on the GILTI and FDII regimes, in case the regimes end up being repealed afterwards. 
In conclusion, the FDII and GILTI provisions will together inevitably have a significant 
impact on all U.S. MNEs exploiting intangibles and carrying out activities abroad. This 
concerns especially new business fields, where the income is typically derived from 
innovations, patents, software, and other intangibles. On the other hand, the provisions affect 
                                                 
62 Conference Report 2017 p. 625. 
63 16.406% as of year 2025. 
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also U.S. MNEs conducting traditional business relying on factories and manufacturing. In 
light of the above, for example investment location decisions of new factories may have 
significantly different results under the GILTI and FDII regimes, depending on whether the 
investment is made onshore or offshore. 
In addition, it is considered that the tax reform benefits U.S. MNEs whose business models 
are dispersed and based on local ownership of intangibles. On the other hand, U.S. MNEs 
whose business models are based on broad, global distribution of work and centralized 
ownership of intangibles might suffer from the tax reform. Despite the existing business 
model, any U.S MNE would anyway have to reassess their operations in light of the TCJA.64 
The corporations are thus recommended to pay due consideration to the impact of these 
provisions and possible restructuring needs. 
4.2 A Few Consequences Observed So Far 
As only one year has passed after the enactment of the FDII and GILTI provisions, there are 
not yet many real consequences to be observed. However, during the year representatives of 
many U.S. MNEs have already presented their preliminary views on the real impact of the 
provisions, and some effects can also be deducted from the financial documentation and 
other reports filed by U.S. MNEs.  
First, it has been pointed out that the implementation of the GILTI regime does actually seem 
to result in a worldwide tax regime with a lower rate on foreign income. This is because 
many U.S. MNEs do not apparently have enough tangible investments offshore, so that they 
could benefit from the exemption corresponding to 10% deemed return on tangible assets.65 
Thus, the implementation of the GILTI provision has created a new, wide category of income 
subject to tax in the U.S., and it can definitely encourage offshoring of activities relating to 
tangible assets in the long run. 
With regard to the FDII regime, based on the statistics it seems that there has not been a 
consistent and massive movement of offshore intangibles being transferred into the U.S. at 
least not yet. Pursuant to OFII’s Quarterly Reports of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 
the U.S., during Q1/2018 the FDI amounted to USD 63.7 billion, thereby not substantially 
                                                 
64 Viitala – Ahonen 2018 p. 13. 
65 Avi-Yonah 2018b p. 4–5.  
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deviating from the previous quarters. This was followed by a negative quarter, resulting in a 
divestment of USD 0.8 billion in Q2/2018. However, during Q3/2018 the FDI went up to 
USD 116.3 billion according to the preliminary report.66 
In this context, it should be noted that the presented figures are only suggestive towards the 
real impact of the FDII provision. The tariff policies and other trade actions from the Trump 
Administration have also assumedly affected the figures in great length. On the other hand, 
there are also signs that the FDII regime has been exploited to some extent. Based on the 
published SEC 100-K forms by U.S. MNEs regarding year 2018, it seems that many 
corporations were able to benefit from reductions under the FDII provision in their overall 
tax rates.67 Despite this, it seems that the expectations towards the FDII regime have not 
fully fulfilled at least for now. 
The modest exploitation of FDII regime probably has to do with uncertainties relating to the 
permanency of such regime. Apart from uncertainties deriving from the domestic political 
situation, it is also uncertain whether the FDII regime constitutes a harmful tax regime or a 
prohibited export subsidy and is thus contrary to international commitments in the OECD 
and the WTO. The legitimacy of the FDII provision under the tax and trade policies is 
examined in more detail in Chapter 5.2. 
In addition, a decision to shift intangibles into the U.S. would be relatively permanent and 
difficult to overturn: it would be challenging or at least very expensive to transfer intangibles 
assets yet again offshore if the FDII regime is later amended or repealed.68 Due to the recent 
amendments to Sections 367 and 482, the definition of intangibles applied in the U.S. 
taxation has been broadened significantly. This combined with the realistic alternative 
principle means that, in transfers of intangibles, their overall value is often estimated to be 
higher than before. 
The observations discussed above seem to follow original estimations. In a bigger picture, 
the CBO has estimated in their Budget and Economic Outlook for years 2018 to 2028 that 
the reduction of corporations’ incentives to shift profits by transferring intangibles outside 
the U.S. is expected to remain modest. The overall estimate is that the tax reform will 
altogether reduce profit shifting by USD 65 billion per year, on average, over the next 11 
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years. However, this amount seems small compared to the total amount of profit shifting, 
which is still estimated to remain at the level of roughly USD 300 billion per year.69 In 
addition, it is noted that most of the intangibles currently located offshore are expected to 
remain there. This is because tax havens continue to have relatively low tax rates. However, 
for newly created or future intangibles, the TCJA may deter a small amount of profit 
shifting.70 
It remains to be seen whether these predictions hold true. In addition, it should be noted that 
the estimates presented above do not take into account several factors external to the tax 
reform. These include the uncertainties of investors relating to the stability of the FDII 
regime and the legislation in general as well as the tax competition from other countries. 
Thus, it may be that the eventual impact of the TCJA, and consequently also the FDII and 
GILTI regimes, on profit shifting is even smaller than expected.71  
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5 Implications for Europe 
5.1 Preliminary Implications and Reactions 
Since the final implications of the GILTI and FDII regimes are still somewhat uncertain, it 
is also unclear how they will impact the European countries. However, at a general level one 
could assume that the adverse impacts of the provisions in the U.S. market discussed above 
could in principle have positive impact in the European market and vice versa. For Europe 
and other foreign countries, the central issue is whether the GILTI and FDII regimes are 
composed of cooperative or competitive elements in light of international taxation.72 
Consequently, to the extent the GILTI and FDII regimes incentivize U.S. MNEs to shift their 
intangibles into the U.S., Europe would assumedly suffer from decreased revenues and 
R&D. The FDII regime and possible shift of assets overseas thus creates a threat of losing 
revenue and jobs in Europe. This is the central threat the EU and other foreign countries have 
focused on ever since the enactment of the TCJA. On the other hand, if the regimes 
incentivize U.S. MNEs to make tangible investments abroad, for example in Europe, Europe 
would naturally benefit from that in form of increased revenue and job migration.73 As 
mentioned above, it may well be that the regimes ultimately incentivize U.S. MNEs to make 
tangible investments, and in some cases also intangible investments, in Europe and 
elsewhere outside the U.S. 
The GILTI regime has been considered a strong cooperative element, as it might encourage 
foreign countries to maintain their corporate taxes at the minimum rate of 13.125% and the 
U.S. MNEs to accept such corporate tax burdens.74  Thus, its impact does not limit to being 
a stick that encourages U.S. MNEs to locate their intangibles in the U.S. On the contrary, 
offshoring might still be a reasonable alternative for many U.S. MNEs in light of the 
participation exemption and relatively low effective tax rate.75 Having said that, the GILTI 
provision might not even affect CFCs operating in Europe if their local effective tax rate 
exceeds the threshold of 13.125%. However, as we will see in Chapter 5.2.2, many EU 
Member States provide a so called dual rate structure, where the income derived from patents 
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and other similar assets may be taxed at a considerably lower tax rate compared to the normal 
CIT rate. 
On the other hand, as the amount of GILTI is calculated on an aggregate basis and not per 
company or per country, the activities carried out and taxed in Europe cannot be examined 
separately from MNEs’ other offshore activities. This has been argued to increase the 
protection for foreign jurisdictions’ CIT rates.76 However, the other side of the coin is that 
is also encourages to carry out some operations in tax havens in order to offset the final tax 
burden. This makes it very difficult to draw simple conclusions. The overall global structure, 
locations, and tax planning of U.S. MNEs ultimately affect how much of the income accrued 
in Europe is subject to GILTI tax in the U.S. 
The above is only a plain simplification of the impacts in the U.S. and Europe and does not 
take into consideration other relevant market areas such as Asia. Hence, the ultimate 
implications of the regimes remain to be seen. In addition, proceedings at the international 
level for example in the OECD and the WTO may affect the application of the GILTI and 
FDII regimes in the future, should the FDII regime be considered a harmful tax regime or an 
illegal export subsidy. However, at a general level, the TCJA is expected to be very favorable 
to U.S. MNEs because it significantly decreased corporations’ overall tax burden.77 This 
overall impact may encourage the U.S. MNEs to increasingly consider domestic investments 
and focus more on their domestic field in the future. 
From the beginning, the EU has had doubts about the TCJA and especially the FDII regime. 
These doubts were brought in light for the first time already prior to the TCJA’s enactment, 
when five EU finance ministers sent a letter in early December 2017 to Secretary of the 
Treasury Mr. Mnuchin.78 Later on, the EU requested the OECD Forum on Harmful Tax 
Practices (FHTP) to take a closer look of the FDII regime.79 At the moment, the issue is still 
pending in the FHTP and no final decision had been made. On the other hand, the FDII 
regime has not been challenged in WTO for now, but it might because of the pending 
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proceeding in the OECD. Both of these issues will be analyzed in more detail in following 
Chapter 5.2. 
As there are also negative impacts from European point of view, the implementation of the 
TCJA and especially the FDII regime could encourage European countries to take 
countermeasures and thus increase tax competition. First, the impact of GILTI and FDII 
provision can be assessed in light of overall corporate taxation in the U.S. and the EU. This 
might create a pressure for the European countries to lower their applicable CIT rates, 
especially taking into consideration that the U.S. significantly lowered its federal CIT rate 
from 35% to 21% by enacting the TCJA. However, the pressure is not expected to be very 
significant in this regard, as the U.S. did not begin a race to the bottom. On the contrary, by 
lowering their CIT rate the U.S. is now well in line with the average CIT rate of 23.7 % 
among the OECD countries.80 However, some countries where the CIT rate is significantly 
higher, such as Japan, Australia, Germany and France, could be expected to lower their CIT 
rates in the future.81 
In addition or instead of lowering the CIT rate, which would work as a carrot, the European 
countries could also consider introducing a countermeasure that would work as a stick, and 
try to protect their domestic tax base by imposing duties on import. Moreover, European 
countries could introduce CFC rules that would efficiently target European MNEs investing 
in the U.S. through their subsidiaries. This could be done by taxing the profit generated by 
the subsidiaries at the level of the European parent, if the U.S. tax rate applied to the income 
of the subsidiaries is low enough.82 Another alternative would be to impose a global 
minimum tax by following the mechanism of GILTI provision. This measure could be taken 
either unilaterally or in international cooperation. As a matter of fact, the OECD has recently 
presented a proposal regarding global minimum tax that greatly resembles the GILTI 
provision. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.3. 
Finally, albeit it would seem a very radical countermeasure at first sight, the EU could also 
include the U.S. on the list of noncooperative tax jurisdictions if the EU considers that the 
U.S. has not fulfilled its duties under the OECD BEPS Project. The list currently consists of 
                                                 
80 OECD Corporate Tax Statistics 2019 p. 11. The corporate tax rate of 21% in the U.S. is a federal tax; with 
state and local taxes, the total tax rate is in average 24 to 26%. See Viitala – Ahonen 2018 p. 7. 
81 Viitala – Ahonen 2018 p. 7. For now, there have not been any significant reductions in the CIT rates of these 
countries.  
82 Avi-Yonah 2018a p. 9. 
36 
countries that are regarded as tax havens.83 Including the U.S. in that list would thus 
definitely shed a bad light on the country. 
In conclusion, it will be interesting to see to what extent EU Member States and other foreign 
countries will react to the TCJA and bring tax competition to another level. In can be 
expected that the type and extension of potential countermeasures significantly depends on 
how the FDII is ultimately characterized in international context. Thus, next the FDII regime 
is analyzed in more depth in light of the international obligations imposed by the OECD and 
the WTO. 
5.2 FDII under International Scrutiny 
5.2.1 Tax Policy Perspective: Harmful Tax Practice? 
The OECD aims to restrain harmful tax competition by setting limits to and scrutinizing 
preferential tax regimes unilaterally enacted by countries. The issue was addressed already 
in 1998, when the OECD published the report titled Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging 
Global Issue (HTC Report). The criteria that was originally listed in the report for examining 
preferential tax regimes is still applied in the assessment. In addition, the criteria has been 
added recently based on the results and conclusions achieved in the OECD’s BEPS Project, 
under BEPS Action 5.  
The aim of BEPS Action 5 was to counter harmful tax practices more effectively, taking into 
account transparency and substance, and it continued to develop the work of the Forum on 
Harmful Tax Practices (FHTP). The examination of intangible-related preferential tax 
regimes was conducted separately from other regimes, which underlines their specific 
features.84 Furthermore, the BEPS Action 5 was selected as one of the four BEPS minimum 
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standards, i.e. subject to the monitoring process and peer review, which highlights its 
importance in the field of international taxation.85 
Under the Action, it was agreed that the substantial activity requirement would be 
approached by means of the so called nexus approach86, which refers to the benefits being 
conditional on the research and development (R&D) activities carried out by taxpayers 
receiving benefits.87 As the nexus approach requires a link between the income receiving 
benefits and the expenditure contributing to that income, its ultimate objective is to ensure 
that IP income may not be shifted into a preferential jurisdiction without transferring also 
the underlying R&D activity to create that IP.88 
In addition, the assets eligible for preferential tax regimes have been limited. The only IP 
assets qualified for tax benefits under an IP regime are patents and other IP assets that are 
functionally equivalent to patents. This means that the assets need to be legally protected 
and subject to similar approval and registration processes, if relevant.89 The outcome of 
BEPS Action 5 together with the HTC Report set clear limits, albeit with a certain degree of 
discretion, to the preferential tax regimes provided by countries and thus control harmful tax 
competition. 
With regard to the FDII regime, after being over a year in force, it is still under peer review 
conducted by the FHTP. The assessment was on hold until the long-waited Proposed FDII 
Regulations were finally released on March 4, 2019,90 and a final decision has not yet been 
adopted to date.91 If the FDII regime were found to be a harmful export subsidy, there would 
not necessarily be any direct consequences, as the OECD does not have enforcement powers. 
However, it is considered that the U.S. has a lot at stake here because the U.S. depends now 
more on its foreign trading partners than ever before. In addition, the world’s largest trading 
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partners are joining forces to prevent harmful trade and tax practices for example in the 
OECD, the EU, and the WTO.92 
Indeed, five EU Finance Ministers expressed their concern on the FDII regime being not 
compatible with the BEPS consensus already prior to the enactment of the TCJA. In the 
letter, the finance ministers expressed their concerns on possible distortions in the 
international tax consensus and trade and investment environment, and addressed issues 
especially with regard to the contemplated excise tax, base erosion and anti-abuse tax 
(BEAT), as well as the GILTI and FDII regimes. 
As regards the latter, it was explicitly mentioned that the FDII regime could be challenged 
as an illegal export subsidy because it provides a deduction for income derived from 
intangible assets other than patents and copyright software. Furthermore, it was mentioned 
that the FDII regime deviates from the agreed nexus approach by providing benefits to 
intangible income without due consideration to research and development (R&D) 
activities.93 Later on when the FDII regime had already been enacted, Pierre Moscovici, Tax 
Commissioner at the European Commission, affirmed the concerns that the FDII regime may 
be contrary to the OECD BEPS Action 5 modified nexus approach for intellectual property 
regimes.94 
Several commentators have also considered that the FDII regime inevitably constitutes a 
harmful tax regime by not fulfilling even one of the two criteria added by the BEPS Action 
5, the nexus approach and the applicability to patents and similar assets only.95 This seems 
obvious: the FDII regime does indeed contain no requirements whatsoever relating to the 
R&D nor where the income benefiting the lower effective tax rate is actually derived from. 
The calculation of the amount of FDII is solely based on deemed foreign derived, intangible-
generated income. On the other hand, its scope and intention still makes it a regime targeted 
at IP-derived income. 
On the other hand, the U.S. officials have in turn consistently assured that the FDII regime 
is compliant with the OECD regulation on preferential tax practices.96 In this regard, the 
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U.S. strongly relies on the consideration that the FDII provision is not even meant to be a 
preferential tax regime but a balancing element alongside the participation exemption and 
the GILTI regime. The U.S. has emphasized that the GILTI and FDII provisions should be 
examined together. Only this way their overall impact, i.e. neutralization of tax 
consequences regardless of whether foreign intangible-related investments are made through 
a CFC or directly by a domestic corporation, can be acknowledged. 
Thus, the FDII provision is said to act as a mirror with the GILTI provision and add tax 
neutrality in response to base erosion and profit shifting, which the participation exemption 
and the GILTI provision could together create.97 Consequently, according to the U.S. the 
FDII provision should not be regarded as a regime equivalent to for example European patent 
boxes at all, as its purpose is not to incentivize intangibles but to provide for tax neutrality 
between domestic and foreign situations. This purpose of neutralizing and minimizing any 
tax considerations between the alternatives to operate in foreign markets directly or through 
a CFC has also been explicitly mentioned in the recently released Proposed FDII 
Regulations.98 
In addition, a few other issues which could prevent the classification of the FDII regime as 
a harmful tax regime have been presented in legal literature. First, it has been argued that, 
due to the large scope of the FDII provision, it is not actually an IP regime. For example 
going concern value and goodwill are hardly categorized as typical IP assets and thus there 
would not be a nexus requirement to be met. In addition, the criteria for tax regimes is rather 
ambiguous, as the countries adopt different sets of rules and use different techniques in 
creating patent box regimes, and also the classification of R&D expenditures especially with 
regard to sundry expenditures is finally up to the companies.99  
However, opposite views have also been presented. Possibly the strongest counterargument 
is that there is no mandatory connection between the FDII and GILTI provisions. On the 
contrary, the regimes are separate and distinct and can be applied separately to taxpayers, 
meaning that U.S. MNEs may benefit from the FDII regime without having any CFCs and 
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thus being affected by the participation exemption and the GILTI regime.100 In this light, it 
is difficult to see that the favoring arguments based on the necessary connection between the 
regimes and mirror effect would eventually hold water. 
In addition, it has been remarked that the FDII provision does not seem to be tax neutral 
either, as it does not apply to domestic intangible income. Thus, it does make a clear 
distinction between domestic and foreign income derived from intangibles, the first being 
taxed at the rate of 21% and the second at the rate of 13.125%. Finally, it has been pointed 
out that even apart from the new criteria set out in BEPS Action 5, the FDII provision also 
seems to violate the no substantial activities criterion set out in the HTC Report, since it also 
encourages to have few tangible assets.101 
It has been doubted that the final decision by the FHTP has not yet been given because of 
the central role of the FDII provision as part of the tax reform. Considering the specific 
nature of the provision, it is not easily amended to comply with the criteria set out by the 
OECD. The inclusion of the nexus approach to the FDII regime afterwards or its limitation 
to apply only to patents and patent-like IP assets afterwards seems impossible due to its tight 
connection with the GILTI regime and the exotic, all-inclusive approach of the provision.102 
However, it has been suggested that the U.S. could remove the foreign use requirement and 
modify the FDII regulation to be applied also in domestic sales. This would make the 
provision more legitimate in light of international requirements, as the FDII regime would 
no longer incentivize foreign business only.103 
Although the decision by the FHTP cannot be enforced, the decision could have significant 
indirect impact in organizations like WTO, where binding rulings can be given.104 In 
addition, avoiding the opening of the “political Pandora’s Box” and not granting a final 
decision would likewise have a terrible end, as it would seriously detract the credibility of 
the FHTP review process.105 It remains to be seen which position the FHTP will finally adopt 
as regards the FDII regime. 
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5.2.2 Comparison between FDII and European Patent Box Regimes 
Due to the aforementioned discussions at the level of the OECD and the incentives that the 
FDII provision provides, it is interesting to take a closer look at the provision and compare 
it with its equivalent regimes in Europe. Indeed, the FDII provision has been considered by 
the commentators as “the American version to the “patent box” –like regimes.106 This is 
natural because all these regimes seem to have the same objective, i.e. to encourage corporate 
taxpayers to shift their intangibles under certain jurisdiction and to discourage the 
outsourcing of the same intangibles. 
In this section, the FDII regime is compared with certain patent box regimes provided by 
various European countries. The selected regimes for conducting this short comparative 
analysis are the ones provided by Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the UK. These 
regimes have been selected because they have all seem quite attractive from the point of 
view of investors and MNEs operating in Europe. In addition, all these regimes have been 
declared not harmful in the OECD 2018 Progress Report on Preferential Regimes, i.e. they 
are seen to comply with the preferential tax regime rules described above.107 The regimes in 
Ireland and Luxembourg are new and were designed in compliance with the new 
standards.108 On the other hand, the regimes in the Netherlands and the UK are older and 
were recently amended in light of new requirements resulting from BEPS Action 5.109 
The regime offered by Ireland is called Knowledge Development Box. The regime provides 
relief from corporation tax on income derived from patents, computer programmes and, for 
smaller companies, also from certain other certified IP, which are together referred to as 
qualifying assets. If a company qualifies for the regime, it is entitled to a deduction of up to 
50% of its qualifying profits. This means that the qualifying profits may be taxed at the 
effective tax rate of 6.25%. The qualification requires that the company create a usable 
qualifying asset from R&D activities that earns income.  
The IP regime offered by Luxembourg allows the qualifying IP assets to benefit from an 
80% exemption from income taxes, thereby resulting in an effective tax rate of 
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approximately 5%. Eligible assets under the IP regime are inventions protected under 
patents, utility models, and other IP rights equivalent to patents, as well as software protected 
by copyright. On the other hand, market-related IP is not eligible. In order to be eligible, it 
is required that the assets are resulting from R&D activities carried out by the taxpayer itself, 
either in Luxembourg or through a foreign permanent establishment located in the European 
Economic Area which does not benefit from similar IP regime. 
The IP regime provided by the Netherlands is called Innovation Box regime. The regime 
was originally introduced in 2007 and it offers an effective tax benefit on profit derived from 
innovation. Under the regime, profit is effectively taxed at the rate of 7% instead of the 
regular 25% corporate income tax rate. The regime may be applied if at least 30 % of the 
profits have been originated by the patent. Like in Luxembourg, also in the Netherlands the 
software capable of being protected by copyright may be eligible for the application of the 
regime. On the other hand, market-related material such as logos and brands are not eligible. 
In order to be eligible, the company must have been granted an R&D certificate. 
Lastly, the United Kingdom provides a Patent Box regime, which was first introduced in 
2013. Under the Patent Box regime, a lower tax rate of 10% is applied instead of the normal 
corporation tax, currently at the rate of 19%. The regime may be entered into if the company 
holds qualifying IP right, most typically a patent. In addition, the taxpayer is required to have 
undertaken qualifying development on the patents. 
From the above it can be derived that all these allowed regimes are at least in principle 
strictly limited. The regimes contain a detailed definition of income eligible under the 
preferential regime and other requirements for applying the regime. The regimes are strictly 
limited to patents and patent-like assets only, and the taxpayers are required to conduct R&D 
activities in order to benefit from the regime. Thus, benefit provided by these regimes is 
clearly more strictly regulated than the one provided by the FDII regime, which operates on 
assumptions, takes into consideration all of the taxpayer’s income, and does not pay any 
attention to R&D activities. These clear distinctions between the FDII regime, which is still 
under scrutiny, and the European patent box systems, which have been declared not harmful, 
may indicate the FDII regime is indeed in danger of being regarded as a harmful tax regime. 
On the other hand, all European patent box regimes examined here provide for even lower 
effective tax rate than the FDII regime. The effective tax rates are 6.25%, 5%, 7%, and 10%, 
respectively, compared to the rate of 13.125% provided by the FDII regime. This raises a 
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question whether the European patent box regimes are adverse tax competition as well even 
though they formally fulfil the requirements for a preferential tax regime. This view has been 
adopted in legal literature, and the broad negative impact of patent box regimes causing base 
erosion and profit shifting has been pointed out.110 It has even been suggested that the whole 
patent box concept should be delegitimized.111 Reaching such a political decision in 
consensus could however take years. In the meantime, it is for the FHTP and the countries 
to evaluate where the line between allowable patent regimes and illegal preferential regimes 
is drawn. 
5.2.3 Trade Policy Perspective: Illegal Export Subsidy? 
Another powerful measure that the European or other counties could take against the U.S. 
would be to file a formal complaint against the FDII regime in the WTO. Unlike the OECD 
and the FHTP, which only provide recommendations, the WTO could give a binding ruling 
on the FDII regime. The possibility of a WTO challenge as regards the FDII regime has been 
debated ever since the regime was drafted. As with doubts concerning harmful tax practice, 
the threat of a WTO challenge was mentioned for the first time already in the letter by the 
five EU Finance Ministers to Secretary Mnuchin in December 2017, prior to the enactment 
of the TCJA. The Finance Ministers stated that the FDII regime could constitute an illegal 
export subsidy under the WTO SCM Agreement rules.112  
The discussion around a WTO challenge has continued ever since the introduction of the 
FDII provision. For example Pierre Moscovici, Tax Commissioner at the European 
Commission, pointed this out in his answer to parliamentary questions on March 22, 2018.113 
In addition, several commentators have raised the question whether the FDII regime 
constitutes an illegal export subsidy, and many of them have adopted the view that it well 
might.114 
However, a formal complaint has not yet been filed with the WTO even though the FDII 
provision has been in force for more than a year now. According to speculations, this might 
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be because the FDII regime is still under scrutiny by the FHTP in the OECD, and the pending 
process would enable the EU to engage in discovery before filing a WTO complaint.115 It 
remains to be seen whether a complaint is filed in the WTO and how the final outcome by 
the FHTP – either positive or negative – might affect to the decision to file a WTO complaint. 
If the FDII regime was challenged in the WTO, it would be examined under the Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. This is because the FDII regime could be seen 
to violate Article III(2) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as a 
discriminatory internal tax, i.e. a tax that is imposed on importers but not on domestic sellers. 
However, it must first be noted that the SCM Agreement applies to goods only. 
Consequently, the examination of the FDII regime would limit to goods, and any possible 
subsidy the regime provides with regard to provision of services may not be examined under 
the SCM Agreement. This has been considered to significantly reduce the exposure of the 
FDII regime to a WTO complaint.116 
Pursuant to Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement, a subsidy means inter alia a 
financial contribution by a government where government revenue that is otherwise due is 
foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits), and a benefit is thereby 
conferred. There seems to be a wide consensus, even among commentators who might not 
otherwise think that the FDII regime constitutes an illegal subsidy, that the FDII regime does 
fulfill the definition of a subsidy under the SCM Agreement. This is because under the FDII 
regime the corporate income is effectively taxed at the rate of 13.125% compared to the 
statutory CIT rate of 21%.117 
On the other hand, the characterization of the FDII regime as a subsidy has also been 
questioned by doubting whether there is actually government revenue that would be 
otherwise due and not collected or foregone due to the application of the FDII provision. 
The key justification for this argument lies on the comparison of the FDII regime with other 
specific provisions providing tax benefits, i.e. the participation exemption regime, the GILTI 
regime, and the CFC rules, instead of the statutory CIT rate. Hence, if the FDII regime was 
repealed, the taxpayers would arguably be able to enjoy from even lower effective tax rate 
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by resorting to other means.118 Albeit this is an interesting point of view, it does not fully 
answer to the question whether tax benefits under certain regime can be justified by referring 
to other tax benefits only and why taxation under the FDII regime could not be compared to 
the taxation of general corporate income or even domestic intangible derived income, and 
thus to the statutory CIT rate of 21%. 
Assuming that the FDII regime constitutes a subsidy, it would constitute a breach of the 
WTO rules only if it was found to be prohibited or actionable. Most of the debate by the 
commentators has focused on whether the FDII regime constitutes a prohibited export 
subsidy. Pursuant to Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement, prohibited subsidies category 
includes subsidies that are contingent, in law or in fact, upon export performance; and 
subsidies that are contingent, upon the use of domestic over imported goods.119 The 
prohibition means, under Article 3.2 of the SCM Agreement, that no Member shall neither 
grant nor maintain such subsidies. Any Member country may refer the matter of a suspected 
prohibited or actionable subsidy to the Dispute Settlement Body to be ruled upon if prior 
consultations do not result in a mutually agreed solution. 
The key to whether the FDII regime is a prohibited subsidy, i.e. contingent in law or in fact 
upon export performance, seems to lie in whether there indeed exists contingency upon 
export. It has been pointed out that the FDII regime effectively provides for a lower tax rate 
of 13.125% on intangible income derived from serving foreign markets compared to other 
income, which is taxed at the normal CIT rate of 21 %. Moreover, the first mentioned rate 
applies to foreign intangible income whereas the latter applies to domestic intangible 
income. Thus, it is stated that the FDII provision clearly provides for a lower rate to certain 
sales of goods by U.S. MNEs to any foreign person for a foreign use. This has been seen to 
constitute a prohibited subsidy, as it is clearly contingent in law and in fact upon export 
performance.120 
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On the other hand, other views have also been adopted. It has been considered that the FDII 
regime would not constitute a prohibited subsidy on the de jure, in law, basis. This is because 
the FDII provision does not mention export, export earnings, or export performance. In 
addition, the FDII provision does not refer to goods but property, which means many things 
apart from traditional goods, such as IP rights, confidential business information, and 
customer lists, and these items could possibly not be subject to the SCM Agreement due to 
its limitation to goods.121 
In addition, it has been argued that the FDII regime would not constitute a prohibited subsidy 
on the de facto, in fact, basis either. This view has been based on the notions that the FDII 
regime would not actually oblige the taxpayer to export goods as a condition for qualifying 
for the deduction, that the FDII regime is not in fact tied to actual or anticipated exports, and 
that the FDII regime does not operate in a way that any benefit provided by the regime was 
offered in anticipation or expectation of exports. The FDII regime is effectively distanced 
from the term export by pointing out that the sale of property to a person who is not a U.S. 
person for a foreign use, i.e. the definition of the foreign derived deduction eligible income, 
does not limit to the mere export of goods.  
Based on the aforementioned, it has been concluded that even if export might benefit from 
the FDII regime, this is not alone sufficient to treat the FDII regime as a prohibited 
subsidy.122 This view could however be debated, as the real impact of the FDII regime, its 
original aim, and even the mention of “foreign derived” in the name of the regime implies 
that the FDII regime is effectively connected to the export by U.S. taxpayers. 
5.2.4 History of American Export Subsidies and the WTO 
Although the outcome of a possible WTO challenge or whether the FDII provision is even 
challenged is uncertain, it can be mentioned that former attempts by the U.S. to enact a 
provision providing tax relief for U.S. taxpayers on foreign derived income have not ended 
well under the rules of the WTO and its predecessor, the GATT. It all began with the 
domestic international sales corporation (DISC) rules, which the U.S. enacted in 1971. The 
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DISC provisions enabled indefinite deferral of tax on export derived income by treating the 
income attributed to the DISC as it if was earned abroad and exempt from subpart F. In 1976, 
the DISC provisions were found to violate the GATT rules. 
The DISC provisions were replaced by the foreign sales corporation (FSC) rules in 1984. 
Under the FSC rules, U.S. taxpayers could form a foreign entity, typically in a low tax 
jurisdiction, to perform specific functions relating to export sales. As the U.S. taxpayers 
could also benefit from deferral, the FSC rules effectively allowed taxpayers to avoid tax on 
a share of their foreign source income. The FSC provisions were challenged under the new 
binding dispute settlement, the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, which was 
introduced in late 1990s and made rulings binding unless all WTO Members rejected. This 
ended up being one of the largest trade disputes between the European Community and the 
U.S., and finally resulted in a victory for Europe, when the FSC provisions were considered 
to constitute an illegal export subsidy. 
Quickly followed by the ruling on the FSC provisions, the U.S. introduced yet another set 
of rules, the so called Extraterritorial Income (ETI) regime in 2000. The ETI provisions 
inverted the preceding FSC provisions: instead of allowing the U.S. taxpayers to exclude 
part of their foreign source income from their gross income, the gross income definition was 
modified to exclude the export income. The ETI regime was likewise considered violation 
of the WTO rules in 2004. Consequently, the ETI rules were repealed in 2004 and replaced 
by the domestic manufacturing provision. It did not violate the SCM Agreement because it 
was not contingent on export performance. The domestic manufacturing provision, former 
Section 199, was however repealed when the TCJA was enacted. 
The FDII regime and a possible challenge in the WTO have also been analyzed in the light 
of the history explained above.123 It goes without saying that the negative decisions on 
previous provisions relating to taxation of export profits raise a doubt of whether the FDII 
regime follows this path. Some commentators have considered that the similarity between 
the FDII regime and its predecessors indicates clearly that the FDII regime would be contrary 
to the WTO rules, too.124 
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In support of this argument, it has been pointed out that the two central arguments invoked 
by the U.S. in previous challenges could no longer be used. These arguments are the 
rebalancing argument and the double tax argument. With regard to the rebalancing argument, 
it essentially relates to the principle of worldwide taxation which prevailed prior to the tax 
reform. However, the TCJA and especially the participation exemption introduced a shift 
from the worldwide taxation towards territoriality, and thus it seems that there is no longer 
an unbalance that would need to be redressed. In addition, the FDII regime can neither be 
used to correct unbalance caused by alleged discriminatory border tax adjustments, as the 
FDII provision is a deduction allowed in income taxation and not part of indirect taxation.125 
It could however be argued that the territoriality and its extent may de facto be questioned 
even in light of the TCJA. As mentioned earlier, especially the GILTI provision does not 
follow the principle of territoriality. On the contrary, it imposes a worldwide minimum tax 
on certain foreign source income, and the FDII provision is said to mirror that.126 Hence, it 
may be that the rebalancing argument would still hold true at least to some extent. 
In addition, the double tax argument is likewise considered not applicable with regard to the 
FDII regime. Pursuant to Annex I of the SCM Agreement, the countries are allowed to take 
measures in order to avoid double taxation of foreign source income. The export of goods 
and services is however typically not taxed in a foreign country under the general principles 
of international tax law and permanent establishment provisions included in tax treaties.127 
Consequently, it has been considered that the FDII regime is even more likely to be 
challenged and even more likely to fail a WTO challenge than its predecessors.128 
On the other hand, opposite views have also been presented, according to which there is a 
significant disparity between the FDII regime and its predecessors, and that due to these key 
differences the FDII regime would not in fact constitute an illegal export subsidy. First, it 
has been pointed out that all former disputes have derived from the fact that direct and 
indirect taxes are treated differently under the GATT. This is because, under the GATT rules, 
indirect taxes could be rebated upon the export of goods but the rebate of direct taxes on 
income forms an actionable export subsidy.129 Furthermore, it is argued that unlike the 
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predecessors, which were results in trade policy, the FDII regime essentially constitutes a 
tax measure necessary in the combat against profit shifting.130 
If the FDII regime is ultimately considered a prohibited subsidy, it remains to be seen how 
the situation is solved. Unlike previous export subsidies, the FDII regime is tightly connected 
to both the GILTI provision and the whole tax system. Thus, it cannot be simply amended 
or repealed without paying due attention to its overall impact, and the repeal of FDII 
provision would most likely require substantial changes also in other regards. This also raises 
a question of whether the European countries would rather rely on countervailing 
measures.131  
5.3 GILTI as Model for Global Minimum Tax 
Although the U.S. has faced a lot of criticism on the TCJA from the EU, the tax reform also 
involved many improvements in international tax law and supported the combat against base 
erosion and profit shifting. One of the key amendments in this regard was the GILTI 
provision, which introduced an innovative mechanism to ensure minimum tax on certain 
foreign intangible income. This new approach is special because the provision in fact allows 
minimum taxation of income without interfering with the tax sovereignty of foreign 
jurisdictions. 
Consequently, the GILTI regime, including the foreign tax credit equivalent to 80% of the 
taxes paid abroad, may induce U.S. MNEs to pay more local taxes in the local jurisdictions 
of their CFCs and thus increase their effective tax rate. As discussed in Chapter 5.1, the 
GILTI provision has many cooperative elements in light of international taxation. Several 
scholars have argued that the GILTI regime actually encourages subsidiaries of U.S. MNEs 
located in Europe and elsewhere to pay a decent amount of local taxes and discourages zero 
tax planning. Second, it also encourages foreign countries to maintain relatively high CIT 
rates, improves their attractiveness compared to low or zero tax jurisdictions and even 
induces the rise of foreign tax rates.132 Finally, the GILTI provision may also lower the 
incentive for European countries to engage in tax competition.133 
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In legal literature, the GILTI provision has been referred to as a unilateral cooperative 
measure in the combat against base erosion and profit shifting. It has been argued that 
cooperation does not always have to mean multilateral actions. On the contrary, unilateral 
measures with cooperative solutions may promote the objective in the beginning and provide 
a basis for consequent cooperative strategies.134 The view has been supported by referring 
to the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), which was originally a unilateral 
measure taken by the U.S. but ultimately turned into collective, multilateral exchange of 
information, when other countries followed the example.135 In addition, when a country with 
sufficient market power like the U.S. has imposed minimum tax on certain income, other 
countries have the cover to follow the lead and may take similar measures, too.136  
The GILTI provision has also influenced the discussion around taxation of digitalized 
economy, which has lately been subject to intense debate both in the EU and the OECD. 
Originally, the topic on digital tax arose out of multiple cases where large MNEs – typically 
U.S. based – were able to avoid paying almost all taxes as a result of aggressive tax planning. 
The relation between the GILTI regime and digital tax proposals is interesting and it has 
even been considered that the GILTI regime has already partially solved the problem by 
implementing a minimum tax on offshore intangible income accrued by U.S. MNEs.137 
However, even though the GILTI provision prevents U.S. MNEs from enjoying zero or low 
tax liability on certain foreign source income, it does not distinguish income derived from 
exploitation of IPR, other intangibles, and tangibles at a more specific level. Nor are the 
European counties allowed to tax on digital or other income accrued by U.S. MNEs in 
European markets under the GILTI provision. In addition, the GILTI provision only applies 
to U.S. based MNEs and thus does not solve the problems were profit shifting is conducted 
by MNEs based in Europe and elsewhere. Thus, it is unlikely that the GILTI provision alone 
is a sufficient measure to avoid base erosion and profit shifting in the long run. 
There are already signs of other countries being interested in adopting similar measures, 
either unilaterally or at a global level. Recently the OECD published a public consultation 
document on addressing tax challenges of the digitalization of the economy, which continued 
the work initiated in the OECD BEPS Project. The document provided stakeholders with 
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several proposals to be commented and analyzed prior to the public consultation on the tax 
challenges of digitalization held in Paris on March 13 and 14, 2019. One of the proposals, 
the income inclusion rule, bears a clear resemblance to the mechanism of the GILTI 
provision, and this influence has also been explicitly stated in the document.138  
The income inclusion rule is presented as one of the two inter-related rules under the global 
anti-base erosion proposal.139 The global anti-base erosion proposal aims to provide a 
comprehensive solution to profit shifting and ensure that all internationally operating MNEs 
pay a minimum level of tax on their profits. The proposal would apply to all kind of income, 
but it is explicitly mentioned that the greatest risk of profit shifting relates to intangible 
profits. The proposal would not affect the tax sovereignty of each jurisdiction to set their 
own tax rates. Instead, it would reinforce tax sovereignty of all countries to “tax back” profits 
that have not been sufficiently taxed by other countries under their tax sovereignty.140 The 
proposal is suggested to be implemented by amending domestic law and double tax 
treaties.141 
Under the income inclusion rule, a shareholder in a corporation would be required to bring 
into account certain share of the income of that corporation if the income was not subject to 
tax at a minimum rate. According to the proposal, the requirement would only apply to 
shareholders that owned a significant ownership interest in the company, for example 25%. 
The amount of income would be calculated under domestic rules and shareholders would be 
entitled to claim a credit for any tax paid on the attributed income. Overall, the income 
inclusion rule would supplement each country’s CFC rules.142 
The income inclusion rule closely resembles the GILTI provision but there are also some 
differences. Perhaps the most notable difference is that, according to the proposal, no income 
would be carved out. Thus, the income inclusion rule would apply to all profits regardless 
of whether the income derives from exploitation of tangible or intangible assets. On the other 
hand, the GILTI provision provides a minimum tax on deemed intangible income only and 
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does not apply on deemed routine return on tangible assets. In addition, there might be 
deviation in the minimum level of ownership or control required in order to apply the income 
inclusion rule. According to the OECD proposal, the threshold could be for example 25%, 
whereas the GILTI provision is applied to all U.S. shareholders that own at least 10% of a 
CFC. 
The proposal regarding income inclusion rule is still preliminary and several key issues, such 
as the minimum tax rate and minimum threshold for ownership, remain to be discussed. 
Despite the common ground and similar mechanisms, it might be that the final proposal on 
income inclusion rule deviates even more of the original GILTI provision. The idea is not 
flawless and has its own challenges. However, it might be warmly welcomed by OECD 
countries because it could fix some of the challenges that have surged in transfer pricing and 
application of arm’s length principle and simplify international taxation in that regard. In 
addition, the overwhelming approach of the income inclusion rule would presumably be 
more impartial among countries and thus resolve some of the problems relating to the 
proposal of digital tax, which would impact some countries harder than others. It will be 
interesting to see in which direction the international taxation evolves and whether the 
income inclusion rule or other innovative approaches are ultimately adopted. 
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6 Conclusions 
This study has focused on the preliminary implications of the GILTI and FDII provisions 
and central doubts relating thereto. As the TCJA was enacted only less than one and a half 
years ago, final implications are still to be seen. However, at this point it can already be 
recognized that the regimes have significantly affected the taxation of intangible income at 
a global level and raised issues every U.S. MNE needs to take into consideration. 
Furthermore, they have stimulated debates on whether international trade and tax policy 
commitments made in the WTO and the OECD have been breached and provided inspiration 
for future development of international taxation. 
The mechanism the FDII and GILTI regimes are based on is innovative: instead of trying to 
define what could be characterized as intangibles and trying to determine the exact income 
derived from them, the calculation methods are purely based on assumption of routine return 
on tangible assets. Although the calculation formulas are complicated, at least the taxpayers 
are not obliged to recognize their intangibles, provide reports relating to intangibles, and 
explain how their intangibles are related to the accrued income. Depending on the final 
outcome in pending international proceedings, this novel approach may also inspire and be 
adopted by other countries in the future. 
On the other hand, this same innovative nature of the regimes has caused uncertainty in the 
international field. The protectionist features of the FDII regime have raised questions 
whether the regime in fact constitutes a harmful tax regime or a prohibited export subsidy. 
There are no similar adoptions by other countries at least not yet and the FDII regime clearly 
deviates from what has been traditionally thought of when the tax and trade policy 
boundaries have been set. Even though at first look the FDII regime does not seem to comply 
with the policies, it is difficult to say whether the regime ultimately constitutes a breach. 
In addition, it is an interesting remark that the influence of the FDII and GILTI provision 
does not limit to intangible assets only. On the contrary, it might be that the impact is even 
greater on the location of future tangible investments. This is because making tangible 
investments abroad seems to benefit U.S. MNEs under both provisions. In addition, the 
MNEs may also prefer to carry out tax planning in relation with tangible assets rather than 
intangible assets because transfer pricing risks relating to tangible assets are lower.  
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In addition, it should be noted that the transfer pricing provisions relating to intangible assets 
have been tightened both in the U.S. and the OECD. Consequently, it can be expected that 
the transfer of intangibles often results in high value to be compensated, when the assets are 
increasingly regarded as a whole. This makes outbound transfers of intangibles challenging 
for U.S. MNEs in the future.143  
These factors can be expected to reduce willingness of U.S. MNEs to repatriate intangibles 
for the sole purpose of obtaining tax benefits. At the same time, in many cases there are no 
longer huge differences in effective taxation of intangible income between different 
countries. The equalization is due to several reasons such as increased tax competition, 
implementation of GILTI, and global limitations on tax incentives that may be provided at 
a domestic level. Consequently, despite the ever growing role of intangibles in business, it 
might well be that, in the future, the location of intangibles is no longer a key question in the 
tax planning of U.S. MNEs. 
At a more general level, the FDII and GILTI regimes have raised a lot of discussion on where 
the boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable tax competition measures lie and how 
the problem of base erosion and profit shifting should be addressed in the future. Tax 
competition is harmful for every state in the long run, which is why there have been serious 
intents to limit and control it. Perhaps the OECD BEPS Project is the best example of this 
so far. However, the discussion on tax competition has not yet reached an end, it has rather 
barely begun. MNEs operate increasingly at a global level and use more and more intangibles 
in value creation, which cannot always be easily located. This presents challenges for 
international tax law and requires cross-border cooperation between states. 
The future is uncertain, and the future of taxation is always dependent on political changes 
and current fiscal needs. The TCJA was an initiative carried out entirely by the Republicans. 
However, as for the current 116th U.S. Congress, the House is controlled by the Democrats 
and the Senate by the GOP. The new composition combined with observed initial 
implications of the tax reform and international demands may cause pressure for the 
Congress to introduce amendments to the GILTI and FDII provisions and the overall tax 
regime. On the other hand, the innovative and comprehensive approach of the FDII and 
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GILTI regimes, close connection between them, and their central role in the tax reform make 
it challenging for the Congress to adjust the provisions. 
From the point of view of international taxation, the post TCJA tax system in the U.S. is 
essentially based on the territoriality principle. However, it still contains certain features of 
the worldwide taxation principle, for example the GILTI regime. In case amendments are 
made, they could change the current balance and develop the overall tax system in either 
direction. The GILTI provision may be fully repealed, which would dramatically decrease 
the worldwide taxation of US MNEs. On the other hand, the GILTI rate could be increased 
to 21%, i.e. to correspond with the general CIT rate, in which case there would be full parity 
from tax point of view between onshore and offshore income of U.S. MNEs.144 
To conclude, the FDII and GILTI provisions have raised a lot of issues to be discussed in 
the field of international taxation. The international pressure to amend or repeal the FDII 
provision presumably continues still for a long time. On the other hand, the GILTI provision 
and its innovative approach have inspired discussion on the possibility of a global minimum 
tax. At a more general level, there is underlying pressure to adapt international tax rules and 
to match them better with the modern world, where many of the MNEs’ operations are cross-
border or digital. This is a challenge for tax sovereignty and requires cooperation among the 
countries. Ultimately, it seems that the FDII and GILTI regimes are just a new chapter in 
this discussion, and the debate on cooperation in international taxation as well as acceptable 
and unacceptable tax competition will continue also in the future. 
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